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influence to enhance the flow of knowledge from firms that are closer to a leading technological edge 
through to those firms where technological skills are lagging. They are therefore an essential tool 
available to governments in seeking to increase national technological capabilities and international 
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the system overall reflects a policy perspective that has not kept pace with the changing demands of 
global environments. International experiences reflect the need to target incentives where they will have 
maximum impact. This requires targeting particular types and groups of firms and targeting the specific 
technology thresholds relevant to their current levels of technology capabilities. It also implies the need 
for incentive mechanisms that stimulate a demand for technology and skills rather than focusing simply 
on their supply. The report draws attention to the need to redirect the current system of incentives in 
Thailand to place greater attention on efforts to enhance basic engineering and design capabilities, 
building knowledge networks between large and smaller firms and stimulating demand for technology 
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This report provides a summary of current international experiences with financial 
incentives for supporting technology development and identifies some important 
implications for public policy in Thailand.  
 
International experiences have demonstrated the broader public good that can be 
achieved through policies and public interventions that stimulate technology learning 
environments built around clusters or networks of firms and national support 
institutions. Financial incentives serve as a mediating influence to enhance the flow of 
knowledge from firms that are closer to a leading technological edge through to those 
firms where technological skills are lagging. They are therefore an essential tool 
available to governments in seeking to increase national technological capabilities and 
international competitiveness. 
 
Although a wide range of incentives for technology development is in place in 
Thailand the system overall reflects a policy perspective that has not kept pace with 
the changing demands of global environments. International experiences reflect the 
need to target incentives where they will have maximum impact. This requires 
targeting particular types and groups of firms and targeting the specific technology 
thresholds relevant to their current levels of technology capabilities. It also implies the 
need for incentive mechanisms that stimulate a demand for technology and skills 
rather than focusing simply on their supply. 
 
The report draws attention to the need to redirect the current system of incentives in 
Thailand to place greater attention on efforts to enhance basic engineering and design 
capabilities, building knowledge networks between large and smaller firms and 
stimulating demand for technology upgrading.  
 
Other weaknesses identified in the Thai system concern targeting, coordination and 
promotion of the schemes and a lack of an overall evaluation framework. 
 
Failure to come to terms with these issues will see Thailand fall further behind 
economies such as Singapore and Taiwan in terms of national industrial technology 
capability and skills, and in its ability to compete on the basis of ‘knowledge’ rather 
than on other factors of production. 
 
Three basic propositions provide a framework for revisions to the present system: 
 
• government financial incentives should support the full range of technology 
capability building activities within the firm in an integrated manner; 
• incentives must be targeted at those industry sectors, firms and activities that 
are likely to provide the greatest public benefit; and 
• the choice of particular form of incentive (tax incentive, loan, grant) is a 
tactical decision that must take account of local circumstances 
 
The main emphasis in the recommendations is on developing more effective targeting 
and coordination of schemes and generating more flexibility to enable firms to 
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progress through different stages of technology development. Recommendations are 
made under five key headings 
 
• Revising financial incentives for skills development and training; 
 
Recommendation 1 
Large firms should be encouraged to become actively involved in training. This 
could be achieved through their representation on the SDF Board and through 
their involvement in collaborative training arrangements. For example the new 
Skills Development Fund could target specific incentives for in-house training by 




As the SDF develops there should be mechanisms to ‘hold the hand’ of smaller 
companies by setting up training courses and funding company employees to 
attend them. This could be achieved through cash contracts or grants to training 
suppliers (who could be large firms, universities, GRIs) to provide specific 
courses for groups of SMEs. There is no point in funding companies if the 
required training courses do not exist – parallel support for the development of the 
‘training industry’ is also essential. 
 
Recommendation 3: 
Assistance with the analysis of training needs, development of training strategies 
and identification of appropriate training providers appears absolutely essential 
for SMEs. The SDF must devote much of its resources to building this 
fundamental planning capacity within firms. This has been regarded as one of the 
most successful aspects of SDF schemes elsewhere, and also a critical component 
of many incentive schemes that fund consultants to work with companies on 
planning for their strategic needs. We recommend that a proportion of funds be 
allocated specifically for this activity.  
 
Recommendation 4 
The SDF Board should work closely with the private sector to identify priority 
areas in which training funds should be concentrated. This process should take 
account of priority sectors already identified by the government and priorities for-
shadowed by the National Competitiveness Committee. Such priorities should be 
elaborated only after consultation with the private sector and in the light of in-
depth research.  
 
• Recommendations for stimulating SMEs to improve technology capability by 
undertaking design and engineering activities 
 
Recommendation 5: 
The definition of R&D payments should be extended to cover all in-house 
R&D performed by the firms themselves, not only within a firm’s registered 





For SMEs only, the definition of R&D under current financial incentives 
should be extended to cover technology development activities such as design 
and engineering activities that contribute more widely to enhanced 
productivity and competitiveness and not just activities directly linked to R&D 
as is the case at present. 
 
Recommendation 7: 
We recommend that the programs of matching grants offered through NSTDA 
schemes such as CD, ITAP, MTEC, BIOTEC and NECTEC, and through the 
DIP of the Ministry of Industry schemes such as ITB, Project 13 or MDIC. 
should be strengthened and be given greater flexibility in order to provide 
greater incentives for SMEs.  
 
• Building flexibility and options for incremental and progressive technology 
development into the system 
 
Recommendation 8: 
We recommend the Innovation Development Fund be given a high level of 
support from government and that it be established as an independent agency 
under its own Act. Its activities should be coordinated with the delivery of 
matching grants (or credits) through funds provided through NSTDA, DIP and 
the newly formed OSMEP. Coordination could be achieved by allocating 
responsibility to IDF or OSMEP for collating information on project delivery, 
monitoring and evaluation. This agency should report directly to the National 
Competitiveness Committee on monitoring and targeting technology 
incentives in priority sectors.  
 
Recommendation 9: 
We recommend building in greater flexibility to those schemes directed 
toward enhancing engineering and design capability through the introduction 
of ‘innovation credits for design and engineering’ available on a matching 
basis and available only to SMEs.  
 
Recommendation 10: 
We recommend that the grants-based schemes available through NSTDA and 
DIP should be given greater budget flexibility to enable funds to be transferred 
between schemes according to demands within firms and the effective 
implementation of the ‘innovation credits for design and engineering’. 
 
Recommendation 11: 
We recommend that the activities undertaken through the BUILD VMC 
programme be closely coordinated with the grants-based schemes available 
through NSTDA and DIP, thereby marrying the linkage development efforts 





• Enhancing the delivery impact and coordination of grant-based schemes 
 
Recommendation 12: 
Financial sector organisations (such as the SME bank) should be contracted to 
act as administrative and possibly also decision-making intermediaries 
between the private sector claimants and the public sector funding agencies. 
 
Recommendation 13: 
We recommend that the budget directed toward increasing technology 
capabilities to firms other than for R&D should be increased to a level 
approaching 15 percent of the national S&T budget. This should provide 
sufficient stimulation for Thai firms to generate the capacity to more 
effectively absorb and build on the technology capabilities of more advanced 
firms and S&T institutions. 
 
Recommendation 14: 
A single government agency such as the Office of SME Promotion should be 
identified as the first point of contact for all schemes providing financial 
incentive for R&D, technology acquisition and development, and technical 
skills and training. The agency should have the task of publicising the schemes 
and disseminating information on eligibility, guidelines for funding etc. and 
for coordinating applications. Administration of the schemes would remain 
with existing Department (such as BOI and MOF schemes). 
 
Appropriate industry liaison bodies should be co-opted to deliver information 
on the schemes to their members/constituents.  
 
• The drive for national competitiveness. 
 
Recommendation 15: 
We recommend that a ‘policy forum for technology development incentives’ 
be established with representatives of all key agencies involved in the delivery 
of financial incentives for technology and skills development. The IDF and 
OSMEP would be appropriate agencies to initiate such a forum that should 
also have strong private sector representation. The forum should undertake to 
coordinate the scope and delivery of the incentives, and develop a strategy for 
comprehensive monitoring and evaluation of the schemes. It should also 
undertake to advise the National Competitiveness Committee and the Office 
for SME Promotion on the scope and impact of the financial incentives system 








Improving the System of Financial Incentives for 
Enhancing Thailand’s Industrial Technological 
Capabilities 
 
1. Introduction to the study 
 
1.1 Background  
 
The Thailand Country Partnership for Competitiveness has identified science and 
technology as a high priority for development. As part of this process the World 
Bank, together with the Thai government, have been exploring strategies for 
enhancing technological capability for industrial development. 
 
Government policies and the institutional framework in support of technology 
development in Thai firms were recently reviewed for the World Bank by a team led 
by Technopolis of the United Kingdom (Arnold et al, 2000). This study found that 
technology and innovative capabilities in Thailand have lagged well behind 
comparable Asian countries. For example, their report drew attention to the 
observation that the current intensity of R&D performed by business enterprises in 
Thailand lags around 10-15 years behind the level in Korea in the early 1980s when 
that country had a similar level of industrial and manufacturing development as 
contemporary Thailand. The intensity of business-performed R&D in Thailand would 
need to be increased to around 20 times its present level in order to ‘catch up’ with the 
intensity in Korea at that corresponding earlier stage of industrial development.  
 
In order to maintain a leading edge in technology capability, industrially developed 
countries around the world have made use of a wide range of policy incentives and 
institutional structures to encourage technology learning and innovation in firms and 
publicly funded support institutions. Many countries have made use of taxation 
incentives, loans, grants and skills development schemes to maintain technological 
competitiveness in firms. The mechanisms for delivery and focus of incentives for 
technology development in different countries has varied; so too have their success. 
However, an important observation that that can be made is that incentive 
mechanisms have delivered maximum benefit when they have been carefully targeted 
and directed toward the critical technology thresholds faced by firms in the countries 
in which the policy instruments are introduced.  
 
The Phase 1 study found that for firms in Thailand, at its present stage of 
technological development, the most important thresholds of technological capability 
that firms need to cross are not concerned with formally organised R&D but with 
other technology development and learning activities:  
 
• For larger firms, they were about building design and engineering capabilities 
as a basis for starting significant technology development activities; 
• For the majority of SMEs, especially in traditional industries, they were about 
increasing the efficiency with which existing technologies were acquired, used 
and operated.  
• Only a few firms had the capability to move forward to R&D activities.  
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Overall, the study identified a need to build up firm-based innovative activities and 
capabilities, to encourage learning-based activities within, and collective effort among 
firms, to link with and exploit the technology development activities of MNCs and 
using policies on FDI to influence technological behaviour.  
 
The study suggested that grant-based incentives, if designed and applied 
appropriately, might be more effective in the Thai context than tax incentives, and 
recommended that two further issues should be thoroughly examined in order to 
improve existing grant-based schemes: 
 
1. Whether and how a simple and flexible grant-based mechanism could be put in 
place to stimulate firms to undertake technology development activities involving 
forms of design and engineering work that would not meet the eligibility 
conditions of the existing R&D tax incentive system.  
 
2. Whether and how a flexible grant-based mechanism could be established in order 
to assist firms invest in training and related capability building activities 
concerned with strengthening their human resources for design, engineering and 
R&D. 
 
These two issues provide key questions for the present (‘Phase 2’) study. The overall 
objective is to investigate and identify ways to improve the incentive structure for 
stimulating industrial technology development by reviewing Thailand’s fiscal 
incentive regime and providing recommendations on the design of more effective, 
flexible, grant-based mechanisms and supporting institutional and legal infrastructure. 
 
The scope of the study is covered under the following terms of reference: 
 
• Analysing and improving grant-based mechanisms to stimulate firms to undertake 
design and engineering activities;  
• Analysing and devising grant-based mechanism to assist firms invest in ‘learning 
intensive’ training and related capability building activities; and 
• Reshaping existing enabling laws and grant-providing institutions and/or 
establishing new ones. 
 
 
1.2 Approach to the project  
 
The first task for the present study was to carry out a review of international 
experiences with financial incentives for driving technology capability and learning in 
comparable countries. These experiences were then used to provide benchmark for the 
analysis of the Thai system and to develop a strategy for action to improve their 
performance in Thailand 
 
A second and parallel task was to review the Thai system of incentives for enhancing 
technology capability. This part of the study was not an in-depth review of individual 
schemes and their management or effectiveness. Rather, it was a review of the 
schemes as a whole and how they compare with developments and experiences in the 
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internal context. The international benchmarks and a set of ‘diagnostics’, described in 
more detail below, was used as a framework for the review and analysis  
 
 
1.3 Developments since the Phase 1 study 
 
Two significant developments relevant to the present study have occurred since Phase 
1 of the present study was completed. The first of these has been the drafting of 
legislation for The Science and Technology Act to provide a legal framework  for S&T 
agencies (both private and public) for the implementation and coordination of S&T 
development.  A major feature of the Bill, likely to go before parliament over the next 
year, is that it will broaden the scope of the National Science and Technology Policy 
Committee in the area of budgetary approval for S&T projects and establish the 
Office of National S&T Policy. The Office when it becomes established will be an 
autonomous agency providing advice on S&T planning and policy, human resource 
development for S&T, and a range of activities to promote research and development 
and  technology transfer. 
 
A second development, also with implication for the present study, has been the 
development of legislation for the Thailand Skill Development Fund (SDF) Act. The 
new Skill Development Fund when it comes into operation will apply a levy of up to 
1 per cent of the payroll on firms that do not carry out ‘adequate training’ as 
determined by the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare. The levy is thus an 
incentive to encourage firms to carry out their own training either in-house in 
collaboration with training providers or externally through training providers.  This 
latter development is important in the context of the present project because it will 
provide a potential new mechanism for providing training that is in demand by firms  
for raising the capacity to absorb new technology. 
 
 
1.4 Outline of the report 
 
Following this introductory section, the substance of the report is presented in three 
parts: 
 
Chapter 2 of this report provides a summary of current international experiences with 
financial incentives for supporting technology development. The review identifies 
some important trends in public policy and an urgent need in Thailand to catch up 
with developments elsewhere in the region.   
 
Chapter 3 presents an overview of current schemes and identifies some major issues 
and areas where the system as a whole could be made more effective. 
 
The final chapter outlines a strategy and recommendations for improving the Thai 
system and bringing it more into line with the current technological challenges and 
opportunities facing Thailand today. It is recommended that this can be achieved 
through more strategic targeting of schemes to enable the incentive system to be more 




2. Financial Incentives for Enhancing Technology Capability: 
international experiences and trends  
 
2.1 The challenge of industrial technology and innovation environments 
 
The global industrial innovation environment of the 2000s is vastly different from that 
which predominated around two decades ago (the period in which science and 
technology policies in South-East Asia were attracting considerable interest and 
support from national governments). These differences have led to some new 
approaches for supporting innovation and technology development. Some particularly 
significant observations have contributed to these new approaches. They include the 
following.  
 
• A recognition that there is little national economic benefit in strengthening 
knowledge producing and support institutions independently from technology 
capacity building in wealth creating firms. This has reinforced a growing 
trend among governments to focus explicitly on firms as the prime agents of 
innovation supported by specialist capabilities and technical services provided 
by public institutions.  
• The majority of important decisions within firms concerning what to 
produce and how to produce it are crucially influenced by the way in which 
the owners and managers of firms respond to the incentives available to 
them. There has been a growing emphasis in most countries to design and 
introduce financial incentives to stimulate technology development in firms that 
can maximise the flow of technical skills and knowledge throughout (as well as 
beyond) the sector in which they are operating. 
• A recognition that learning and technology acquisition is a continuous, 
cumulative and incremental process. Associated with this has been the need to 
bridge local, national and international knowledge and innovation systems, 
rather than focusing on developing an isolated national innovation system. 
• A recognition of the importance of industry clustering in the process of 
collective acquisition of skills and the diffusion of technology among smaller 
firms. This has moved the policy focus away from single sectors and toward the 
identification of clusters of sectors and interacting firms and institutions and 
emphasised the salience of knowledge networks rather than simply technology 
itself in driving innovation. 
• Technological systems vary in character and extent within national 
economies and consequently lead to different technological capabilities; In some 
regions there are particularly dynamic innovation environments where 
information and knowledge are rapidly diffused. This raises the capacity of 
firms and support institutions and reduces uncertainty and risk. 
• While the globalisation of multi-national firms has progressed there has been a 
trend toward increased localisation of many decisions within these firms and an 
industrial reliance on knowledge intensity rather than capital or labour 
intensity. 
 
This changing environment has demanded new ways of ‘thinking about’ industrial 
technology policy in the context of a ‘global knowledge economy’. They imply new 
ways of formulating and implementing policies for raising and diffusing technological 
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capability and for overcoming barriers within firms to technology upgrading. 
Responses to these demands from the more advanced industrialising countries in Asia 
has been to move toward the introduction of financial incentives for supporting 
technology learning, development and diffusion through firms - as the key agents 
driving technology development - rather than through the provision of services 
provided through public institutions. The rationale has not been simply to provide 
financial assistance to firms to upgrade their technological capabilities.. It has been to 
generate an environment in which technological learning becomes a necessity for 
firms right along the value chain. Thus, an increasingly rich array of policy 
instruments and mechanisms have been focused on stimulating demand for 
technology development in firms rather than simply supplying capacity building 
services through public institutions. 
 
This has not meant that public institutes become less relevant - rather, it has meant 
that they become more relevant. This is because their services and support structures 
can be more effective with the introduction of new measures to strengthen the demand 
for technology within firms and their capacity to absorb, use and diffuse technology.  
 
This policy transition can be described as moving toward: 
 
(a) an enterprise-based system of financial incentives for enhancing industrial 
technology capabilities; and  
(b) a dual system of incentives that strengthens support institutions in parallel with 
the capacity of industrial firms to build on that support and engage in technology 
learning and development. 
(c) This has given rise to a third policy emphasis concerned to build closer interaction 
and mutual interdependence between the enterprise system and the support 
institutions. 
 
Thailand has lagged behind in making this transition and as a consequence is behind 
many other Asian economies in terms of building up industrial technological 
capability within firms. This is in spite of concerted efforts of government over the 
past two decades to develop an appropriate infrastructure to support science and 
technology for industrial development. Evidence from other countries and different 
sectors have demonstrated that firms in newly industrialising countries can begin in 
the middle of the innovation cycle and catch up to global competitors.  
 
In many cases clearly targeted policies have been extremely successful in enabling 
firms to cross critical technology thresholds. The experiences of countries such as 
Singapore, Korea and Hong Kong show that followers don’t always have to be 
laggards. However, the evidence also shows that the ‘latecomers’ and their 
governments must go through a series of difficult technology development transitions.  
 
Economies, such as Chinese Taipei, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Malaysia 
have, in contrast to Thailand, been far more effective in ‘capturing’ technological 
capability and diffusing this capability, through people and the firms in which they 
work, for the benefit of their economies and their societies more generally. The policy 
environment over which their governments have influence has been a vital factor in 
their success.  
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The following brief stories illustrate the different ways that economies can turn 
policies toward achieving technological goals, but in quite different ways according to 
their different levels of technology capability and the prevailing industrial and 
institutional infrastructure. Malaysia (Exhibit 1) and Singapore (Exhibit 3) illustrate 
strategies that have focused on the role of MNCs and their supply chains, especially in 
Singapore. Hong Kong (Exhibit 2) illustrates a laissez faire policy which is now being 
augmented by government support for the scientific and knowledge infrastructure. 
South Korea (Exhibit 4) is a case where policy has been strongly directed by 
government through conglomerations of local firms.  
 
Some valuable underlying lessons for Thailand, in its present phase of industrial 
development, can be drawn from these cases. The first concerns the need to have a 
flexible system capable of responding to changing technological demands as global 
and local technological and business environments change. This generally results in a 
rich variety of schemes that has the capability to evolve over time and explicitly 
capture the externalities and spillover benefits inherent in skill and technology 
development activities. A second concerns the need to coordinate the promotion 
and delivery of incentives in order that they can collectively contribute toward 
stimulating and supporting firms to cross critical technology thresholds that will 
maximise impact. Thirdly, the cases vividly illustrate that technology development 
and diffusion can be maximised by targeting incentives toward groups of firms 
that include large and small operators along the value chain. Flows of technology, 
skills and knowledge can be leveraged by carefully targeting incentives toward 
different groups of firms and institutions and in particular by drawing larger firms 
more centrally into the diffusion process. A fourth and salient lesson is that most 
countries are already aggressively promoting the development of technology-based 
clusters and networks through targeted financial incentives. Unless countries such as 
Thailand also make such investments they will become more peripheral to the centres 
of dynamic productive activity that are currently driving industrial innovation in the 
region. 
Exhibit 1: Malaysia – the search for spillovers 
Since Malaysia achieved independence in the 1960s, the role of technology in development 
policy has evolved greatly. In particular, in the mid 1980s, the government embarked on a 
large-scale program to promote industrialisation through technological development in 
targeted industries. As a result of dissatisfaction with the failure to date of investments by 
MNCs to provide substantial spillovers, public R&D expenditures were centralised in the 
Fifth Malaysia Plan of 1986-90 and the Intensification of Research in Priority Areas 
programme of 1986. Increased private sector input was provided as a result of the Action Plan 
for Industrial Technology Development (1990). 
 
Although government spending on R&D more than doubled between 1986 and 1995 and 
public sector technology institutes expanded greatly, a feeling arose that activities had 
become excessively centralised and bureaucratised and that, as a result, they were not 
sufficiently efficient in meeting industrial needs. To counteract these tendencies and to 
harness technological dynamism in the private sector, from 1993 government policy took a 
new direction. In order to encourage the creation of industrial clusters, the Malaysian 
government sought increasingly to gain spillovers from MNCs operating locally. In a policy 
similar to Singapore’s, the government has tried to promote technological advance in 
indigenous firms that belong to subcontracting networks centred on foreign firms (largely 
from Japan or East Asian NICs) with manufacturing operations in Malaysia. 
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Through keiretsu-like structures, small local firms are meant to gain resources to upgrade 
their technological skills and reduce Malaysia’s high level of dependence on labour-intensive 
operations. A cluster in Penang, built on disk-drive firms that had migrated from Singapore, 
has been viewed as especially successful. A more recent phenomenon, the Multimedia Super 
Corridor, is currently receiving large funding from the Malaysian government in order to 
generate another private-public cluster.  
 
Although it is too early to evaluate these initiatives fully, there are concerns that, in reality, 
the spillovers from MNCs to indigenous firms are less than had been hoped. Moreover, the 
thinness of the local pool of skilled and educated labour may create a bottleneck to further 
rapid development if MNCs capture the bulk of the skilled workforce and, as a consequence, 
crowd out locally-based firms that wish to participate in technological upgrading. This had led 




Exhibit 2: Hong Kong – development with low levels of government direction 
From the 1960s onwards, the Hong Kong economy developed rapidly as measured in terms of 
per capita GDP. This was accomplished with very little government intervention, especially in 
the manufacturing sector.  
 
After the late 1970s, the government began to direct more attention to the micro-economy. 
For example, in 1982, the Industrial Development Board was establish. Alongside the Board 
have been other groups such as the Hong Kong Productivity Council. Even when taken 
together, however, their activities are still very modest by the standards of most other 
countries. Instead, generalised incentives including comparatively low rates of corporate and 
government taxation have continued to feature prominently in development policy. 
 
Despite the prosperity that Hong Kong has achieved, the policy has had mixed results from a 
technological point of view. The manufacturing sector in Hong Kong is still concentrated 
largely in low-technology industries such as textiles. As both labour and land costs in Hong 
Kong have increased, locally based manufacturing activities have been priced out of the 
market to a substantial extent. Instead, a number of Hong Kong concerns have become 
‘hollow’ firms, which maintain their administrative and development activities in Hong Kong 
but have transferred their factories further afield, primarily into adjacent parts of China. 
 
On the other hand, there has been substantial upgrading in the consumer electronics industry 
as a number of Hong Kong firms have switched from sole reliance on OEM contracts to 
introduce their own brand names for export. These firms often have technical departments in 
which they develop features to make their goods more attractive to customers. 
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Exhibit 3: Singapore – technology transfer by TNCs 
In contrast to Hong Kong’s reliance on locally-owned firms that acted as OEMs, Singapore 
encouraged foreign companies to set up operations and to use Singapore as an export base for 
third markets. In the words of Lee Kuan Yew (1976, quoted in Chiu, et al., 1997, 127-128); 
 
‘From 1965, when Singapore became independent on her own, we have had to constantly 
review and revise our policies. The fundamental issue was how were we to make a living as a 
nation on our own. We have found one answer to this in rapid industrialization, encouraging 
industrialists of the advanced countries to export not manufactured goods to Singapore for re-
export, but their factories, technological management expertise and marketing know-how. 
 
Despite the growing share of TNCs, the government became concerned about long-term 
prospects in the late 1970s and 1980s. Worries centred on a number of factors including rising 
wages and land prices, relatively low productivity growth, increased European and American 
resistance to imports of textiles and garments, and the need to maintain a strong Singapore 
dollar in order to bolster the important financial services sector. The government, therefore, 
industries with higher rates of productivity growth and greater long-term potential than some 
current industries. To free up labour, the government decreed wage increases higher than 
could be justified by traditional levels of productivity increase in sectors such as textiles and 
garment manufacturing. Given the relative technological backwardness of locally-owned 
firms, therefore, the government encouragement of technology upgrading and restructuring 
involved further emphasis on the recruitment of TNCs in appropriate industries. 
 
Branches of electronics such as semi-conductor manufacturing and software have benefited 
from government policy, which explicitly targets sectors seen as strategic to the local 
economy. In addition to encouragement of investment by foreign firms, policy has also been 
directed towards modernization of the indigenous sector through the Local Industry 
Upgrading Programme, which is intended to increase the rate of technology transfer to 
locally-owned firms. A further arm of technology policy is the National Science and 
Technology Board (NSTB), which was established in 1991 to generate a world-class 
technology base in selected sectors. Among other activities, the NSTB sponsors and 
coordinates government research institutes. 
 
Exhibit 4: Korea – centralised direction in technological change 
As Korea evolved from a very poor country in the late 1950s to one of substantial prosperity 
in the 1990s, its policies towards the encouragement of technological change have also 
evolved. In the 1970s, Korean policy emphasized the maintenance of management control in 
Korean hands. As a result, neither Foreign Direct Investment nor licensing of foreign 
technologies were highly approved by the government. Instead, technology policy revolved 
around reverse engineering and imports of foreign-made capital goods, financed for the most 
part by borrowing funds from abroad. Through reverse engineering, Korean firms (many of 
them large, diversified chaebol that could achieve economies of scale) were able to develop 
skills internally, although this worked only for mature industries in which intellectual 
property was widely available. Both industries and firms were selectively targeted by 
government technocrats, but management competence was insisted upon as chaebols could 
easily lose government support if they did not use their resources efficiently. Education and 
training received high levels of government support, but these were matched by very high 




Subsequently, as Korea has moved beyond its reliance on mature industries, government 
policy has shifted more to the acquisition of cutting-edge knowledge and the development of 
indigenous capabilities. As foreign firms have often been unwilling to surrender their 
competitive advantage by licensing the most up-to-date knowledge, this has forced Koreans to 
engage in their own advanced R&D in order to continue technological upgrading. The 
government has supported this upgrading through its Industrial Generic Technology 
Development Project, National R&D Project, and Highly Advanced National R&D Project. 
The latter, also known at the G-7 Project, is intended to raise Korea’s technological 
capabilities to a par with those of the G-7 countries by 2020. 
 
Much of the funding for these projects is channeled through Government Research Institutes 
(GRIs) that aim to build in-depth technological capabilities in designated industries. R&D by 
private firms is also emphasized, and there is a concentration of both GRIs and private R&D 
facilities in Taedok Science Town (although not one that meets world standards). Since 1980 
the government has also increased its efforts to promote technological upgrading by SMEs. 
 
While Korea’s centrally-directed technology policy coincided with enormous growth in its 
early decades (the high period of what Chalmers Johnson has termed ‘the developmental 
state’ in relation to Japan), Kim (2000) has blamed some of Korea’s more recent troubles on 
excessive centralisation in the hands of bureaucrats who are no longer in touch with modern 
needs. As a result, he contends that the National Innovation System Korea has become too 
rigid and should be reformed. One message that could be drawn from Korea’s experience is 
that, although centralisation of innovation policy may work well in a relatively small 
economy whose efforts are based on the assimilation of knowledge concerning mature 
industries, centralisation becomes less appropriate as technological complexity increases. 
 
 
2.2 Financial incentives for technology development and innovation in firms: 
Why and how? 
 
The economic rationale for public financial support for R&D and technology 
development and innovation within firms relies on arguments of ‘market failure’ 
flowing from particular characteristics of these activities.1 There is also a strong case 
for public support to overcome ‘system failure’ in terms of deficiencies in the broader 
system of innovation and knowledge institutions and infrastructure of the country by 
comparison with competitor economies. Both arguments can be applied to Thailand.  
 
The rationale for introducing publicly funded incentives is based on achieving broad 
social benefit, not on providing benefits for individual firms (although these may also 
occur) and the recognition that without subsidies social benefit will not be realised 
because of ‘market failure’. Two forms of market failure are recognised: 
 
• Externalities and spillovers: Private firms operating under market conditions 
under-invest in technology development relative to the level that would be 
socially desirable. This is because of the difficulty of appropriating the benefits of 
knowledge and because of spillovers of the benefits of new technology (such as 
higher quality products, or lower prices to consumers). Government’s role is to 
stimulate higher levels of investment up to the point where the marginal cost 
equals the marginal social return. 
                                                 
1  This summary is taken from the Phase 1 report (pp. 73-5). 
 10 
• Other market imperfections: Uncertainty and risk in technology investment per se, 
and compared with other kinds of investment may lead companies to be over-
cautious and invest less than is perhaps justified by the potential private return.  
 
The second form of market failure is magnified in the case of industrialising countries 
like Thailand. Here, firms are less likely than firms in industrialised countries to be 
experienced in assessing the costs and future private returns from their investment in 
technology. Further, they face greater difficulty in gaining access to the necessary 
skills and resources at a predictable cost. This makes technological learning more 
complex, and the activity of innovation more risky than in ‘experienced’ firms in 
industrialised countries.  
 
Economists also recognise that the particular source of the ‘innovation market failure’ 
varies with the type of innovation (diffusion of existing technology, incremental 
improvement, radical science-based technology) and that each requires a different 
policy response (Martin and Scott, 2000). 
 
The case for providing public support for technology development and innovation 
within firms because of ‘system failure’ recognises that many of the ‘building blocks’ 
of the innovation system are missing or poorly developed and a practical policy 
requires government to create them. The rationale for policy action in this case is put 
forward by Keith Smith, who argues that market based systems:  
 
…not only suffer from an under-supply of knowledge, but are like to actually 
generate areas of systematically weak performance. These areas of ‘systemic 
failure’ may call for actions contrary to conditions of perfect competition, for 
example, cooperation and collaboration between firms to facilitate knowledge 
flows, government regulation and the creation of incentives. (Smith, 1998: p. 
41). 
 
Four categories of ‘system failure’ have been identified: failures in infrastructure 
provision and investment (both physical infrastructures like telecommunications and 
‘knowledge’ infrastructures like technical institutes and regulatory bodies); transition 
failures (e.g. difficulties that firms have in adapting to technological change); ‘lock-
in’ failures (caused by the difficulty of discarding existing techno-economic 
systems); and institutional failures (regulatory and intellectual property framework, 
corporate law etc).  
 
In addition to these arguments for public intervention there is also the pragmatic 
argument that, for whatever reason, other countries – industrial and industrialising 
countries that Thailand is in competition with –have accepted the above arguments for 
intervention both for the ‘system’ and for firms.. They are providing incentives for 
technology development and learning within firms, and businesses. Thailand will be 
further disadvantaged if the Government does not match the incentives available 
elsewhere.2 
 
                                                 
2 The Phase 1 report went further in finding that opposition to financing these activities in firms was a 
fundamental obstacle to strengthening technology development within enterprises. 
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Finally, international experiences have demonstrated the broader public good that can 
be achieved through policies and public interventions that stimulate technology 
learning environments built around clusters or networks of firms and national support 
institutions. Financial incentives that build knowledge flows through firms engaged at 
different levels through the value chain serve to benefit all firms in the chain, not just 
the initial or direct beneficiaries of incentives. An important observation is that the 
financial incentives can serve as a mediating influence to enhance a flow of 
knowledge between firms that are closer to a leading technological edge through to 





Financial Incentives for Technology Development:  
Adjusting the Learning Environment 
 
 
International experience shows that the new global environment demands a dual 
approach to supporting technology development and innovation. There is a need for 
programs and initiatives that strengthen support institutions while at the same time 
supporting the capacity of industrial firms to build on that support and engage in 
technology learning and development. Policy makers must recognise that wealth is 
created by applying knowledge and not simply generating new knowledge.  
 
Each side of this dual approach demands a different set of incentive mechanisms. The 
success of the incentives in generating the maximum possible social benefit depends 
on achieving integration and coordination between the two approaches. Unless firms 
have the capacity to make use of and build on the technological resources available 
through support institutions, investments in support institutions will return minimal 
socio-economic benefit. Similarly, the technological services available through 
support institutions will carry little benefit for firms if they are not directed or aligned 
with firms’ current technology and market capabilities - firms have no option but to 
start from where they are. Many countries in the region have crossed critical 
technology thresholds not by providing additional support through public support 
institutions but by turning attention to incentives to encourage firms to make use of 
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2.3 Financial incentives for building capability in firms: investing in the 
future 
 
There are advantages and disadvantages inherent in different forms of incentive – tax 
concessions, loans, and grants – as summarised in Table A1, Attachment 1. However, 
it is quite possible to design tax incentive and grant schemes that both operate in 
essentially the same way. Although tax concessions are commonly more ‘horizontal’ 
than grants or loans, there is no particular reason why grant schemes have to be more 
‘selective’ than tax incentives.3 This leads many countries to offer a carefully 
integrated portfolio of financial incentives, each with different targets in term of the 
eligible activities supported and the class of firms or industries eligible to receive 
them. 
 
Within firms, technological capabilities can be thought of as three interlocking sets of 
competencies: production capability (management and engineering); project 
execution (feasibility, training, execution); and innovation capability (Table A2, 
Attachment 1); or more succinctly as ‘the skills, technical knowledge and 
organisational coherence required to make industrial technologies function in an 
enterprise’.4 Technological capability is perhaps revealed most clearly when firms are 
faced with the need to innovate, to change their products, their processes or their 
technological organisation. 
 
Firms in developing economies (indeed, innovating firms in all economies) generally 
need to strengthen all three types of capabilities. As a rule, however, it is not 
feasible for firms in developing economies to achieve capabilities at the highest levels 
because they are not in a position to operate at the cutting edge of technology. In 
addition, substantial gains in per capita income may be attained simply by switching 
from low-productivity, labour intensive activities to ones that involve somewhat 
higher degrees of capital intensity and workforce skill.  Examples drawn from 
Singapore and Malaysia and presented in Attachment 3 offer some good examples of 
effective skills development programs. 
 
While it is possible for firms from developing economies to generate high-technology 
knowledge and skills eventually, as in the Korean semiconductor industry, this is 
time-consuming and is not achieved in one large jump.5 Instead, firms in LDCs 
generally begin to improve their relative positions by entering mature industries in 
which technologies are more highly codified and proprietary knowledge is no longer 
closely held.6 An important role of governments in LDCs, therefore, is to help firms 
to gain the range of capabilities (knowledge) that they need to function at intermediate 
levels of technological sophistication, at which codified knowledge is already widely 
available. 
                                                 
3 See the Phase 1 report, p. 82. 
4 Lall, 2000: p 29 “Technological Change and Industrialization in the Asian Newly Industrializing 
Economies: Achievements and Challenges”, in Linsu Kim and Richard R. Nelson, eds., Technology, 
Learning, and Innovation:  Experiences of Newly Industrializing Economies (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), 13-68. 
5 Kim, 1997 Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea’s Technological Learning (Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press). 
6 Amsden, 2001 The Rise of “The Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies 
(New York: Oxford University Press). 
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With a few exceptions, firms in developing economies do not have the resources they 
need to upgrade their process and product technologies, especially over a reasonable 
period of time. In particular, SMEs (the backbone of most economies whether 
developing or developed) lack both the knowledge required to make informed 
decisions and the financial resources to acquire that knowledge and to invest in new 
technologies once they have traced out a reasonable strategy. In countries with low 
per capita incomes, governments offer the best (and perhaps also the most equitable) 
prospects for concentrating the funds needed to surmount these barriers. In contrast to 
private-sector firms, governments have taxation powers and an ability to provide 
employment opportunities for educated people to create centralised reservoirs of 
technological knowledge. These reservoirs can then be tapped by private firms 
without severe and unnecessarily duplicative search costs. 
 
Public resources are limited, and because resources are scarce, governments have an 
obligation to spend money as wisely as they can – which means that they need to 
establish priorities in helping private firms. From this it follows that, as private firms 
need help in making informed decisions on investments in technology. Scattergun 
approaches to distributing grants are wasteful because not all firms are equally worthy 
of receiving funds. Therefore, governments must develop criteria (‘targets’) for 
selecting the candidates that are most likely to offer substantial social returns to any 
grants handed out. 
 
A key conclusion from recent studies is that most science and technology 
incentives are strongly context- (or country-) dependent. Policies and initiatives 
must be geared to the scientific and technological ‘endowments’ of each country, and 
to their government and business capabilities at particular points in time. Therefore 
government initiatives – like financial incentives - evolve over time as national 
capabilities change. Japan and Korea provide vivid examples of how S&T policies 
and initiatives have evolved in this way. Before borrowing from the experience of 
others in relation to specific incentives, Thailand would be well advised to analyse 
carefully the particular features of the mentor country’s ‘national innovation system’ 
that firstly prompted the initiative, and secondly led to its success or positive impact.7  
 
 
2.4 Targeting incentives: local firms 
 
Locally-owned firms in developing economies are generally less mobile. For the most 
part, they have not developed foreign operations and do not need to think in terms of 
maximising returns across an international portfolio of assets. Hence, their time 
horizons in regard to investments in the home economies may be substantially longer 
than the time horizons of MNCs seeking low factor costs in an unstable international 
climate. Any investments made in the education and training of their workforces are 
therefore likely to remain within the country and be available for other uses no matter 
what happens to their current employers. 
 
                                                 
7 Garrett-Jones, 2000, National Science and Technology Initiatives for ESCWA Member Countries: 
Lessons from the South and East Asian Region, Commissioned paper prepared for the:Technology 
Section Sectoral Issues Policy Division (SIPD) United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia (UNESCWA), Beirut, Lebanon, October 2000. 
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Incentives offered to locally-based firms are more effective when they involve a 
mixture of generalised and targeted policies. This is because generalised grants (for 
example, better provisions of educational facilities or training programs) by 
themselves will not generate enough spillovers to the economy at large. Some aspects 
of the need for generalised government action are uncontroversial and are common in 
OECD member countries as well as in NIEs and LDCs. A well-functioning education 
system that promotes basic literacy and numeracy is a sine-qua-non for economic 
development and increased technological sophistication. Similarly, good provision of 
tertiary education facilities, especially in technical fields, is needed to provide the 
absorptive capacity that a developing economy needs.8 Subsidised training courses for 
apprentices can provide accelerated assimilation of new technologies on the shop 
floor. Other generalised incentives such as export facilitation schemes and tax 
concessions for R&D activities are also widely-used and effective for those firms that 
are already at a comparatively higher level of technological capability. . 
 
Firms in developing economies (usually SMEs) generally lack the intellectual assets 
to make informed decisions on knowledge-based inputs, and if they also lack the 
resources needed to acquire those intellectual assets, then there seem to be only two 
ways forward.  
 
The first is through pure reliance on market-based mechanisms in which a few firms 
succeed through their own initiative (and perhaps some good luck) in upgrading their 
technological capabilities despite the barriers that they face. The mechanisms and 
pathways for getting the process under way are usually not clear. Guides as to how 
firms can gain the assets to finance their initial searches, learn to negotiate deals for 
the licensing of technologies, whom to contact for negotiations, and so on are often 
unavailable to the managers of SMEs in developing economies. In the absence of 
efficient markets, the process depends on having enough capital and knowledge 
(somehow) accumulated in the hands of private individuals or firms with sufficient 
expertise to make informed decisions. The diffusion of such knowledge relies on the 
efforts of others who (somehow) have acquired enough capital and knowledge to 
enter the game as followers. Even if successful, this could be a very lengthy 
procedure. 
 
The second approach, and one which has been more successful in the globalised 
environment, is to make use of the ability of national governments to concentrate 
financial and human resources in order to create a pool of resources to complement 
(not to replace) the resources in the hands of firms. The combined resources in the 
hands of firms and governments can then be used for technological upgrading. Thus, 
while private incentives for efficiency and effectiveness remain, access to requisite 
start-up resources are more readily and more quickly available than through unaided 
market-based mechanisms. This approach is illustrated in Exhibit 6. 
 
The range and levels of grants open to locally-owned firms in industrially developing 
economies is much greater. Not only are locally-owned companies themselves 
taxpayers but, because their roots are deeper than those of MNCs, local spillovers 
                                                 
8  Universal provision of tertiary education is of course desirable, but a base of well-educated 
technologists is also needed to take advantage of the opportunities available to developing 
economies. In other cases, scarce resources could be better allocated to providing high-level 
secondary training in technical fields and supporting apprenticeship and other training programs. 
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from grants are more likely and leakages and wastage are less likely. Nevertheless, 
grants for pure research in countries such as Thailand are not usually offered to 
locally-owned firms because, at this stage of their development, in common with 
MNCs, their activities would be concentrated in mature industries. As a result, they 
would be able to take advantage of foreign advances through licensing, joint ventures 
or spillovers. On the other hand, for locally-owned firms, some grants can be 
extremely valuable for promoting basic development activities. In order to make 
eventual progress up the technological ladder,9 locally-owned firms generally move 
from heavy reliance on OEM status to the establishment of independent brands, where 
competitive success depends on improved process efficiencies and the development of 
attractive product features that are associated with the emerging brand image.10 
 
 















2.5 Targeting incentives: multinational corporations 
 
In the case of multinational corporations, the types and amounts of government 
incentives offered in developing economies are usually more limited. These firms are 
                                                 
9  Say, to follow a path similar to the one taken by the Korean semiconductor industry as described in 
Kim (1997) op cit. 
10  As has happened, for example, in the course of development of many Hong Kong firms as they 
developed from OEMs to MNCs in their own right. SeeYu, (1997), Entrepreneurship and 
Economic Development in Hong Kong (London: Routledge). 
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assumed to produce goods, and sometimes services, at the mature end of the product 
life cycle. Their operations in developing economies are usually restricted to using 
known technologies to turn out standardised goods. Moreover, most MNCs already 
have research establishments in developed countries, with substantial capital 
investments and good access to trained scientists and engineers.  
 
However, as the presence of MNCs can be useful in promoting technology 
transfer, employment and export earnings, governments in developing economies 
need to provide good public infrastructure. In the context of technological change, this 
translates into making sure that the local workforce is sufficiently well-educated and 
trained in order to participate efficiently in technological upgrades. Modest grants for 
firm-level training can be justified for MNCs if the skills learned are largely 
transferable to other uses. Small development grants can also be used to assist in 
adapting the products and processes of MNCs to local needs. To qualify for funding, 
an MNC would have to be deemed a ‘good citizen’, responsive to the needs of the 
developing nation, as well as to meet a number of criteria including the introduction 
of a technology that is both more sophisticated than the norm in the country and likely 




2.6 Targeting incentives: institutional support structures   
 
A range of institutions need to be supported to enable private firms to succeed. These 
institutions include universities, trade schools, and government research institutes 
(GRIs) serving particular industries. As firms operating in developing economies are 
unlikely to be in the technological forefront, they, and government departments, need 
access to highly trained personnel with up-to-date knowledge of international 
technological trends. Otherwise, the ability of firms and departments to engage in the 
next stage of technological improvement will be impaired because of a lack of 
absorptive capacity. Therefore, these institutions must operate at high scientific and 
technical levels to lay the basis for subsequent improvements in the private sector – 
by training scientists and engineers for private and government employment who are 
capable of grasping and acting on the implications of constant improvements in 
technological knowledge. 
 
For a grants system to be effective, these institutions should meet stringent criteria. 
Universities, for example, should continually modernise their courses of study to meet 
evolving needs. They should consult carefully with private firms and with government 
research institutes when drawing up curricula so that their standards are not too 
inward-looking or without reference to commercial usefulness. Similarly, the GRIs 
should develop a perspective for commercial usefulness. Grants offered on a 
contestable basis and cooperative basis to institutions provide a good mechanism for 
maximising impact and cooperation between large and small firms and between GRIs 
and private firms. Collaborative obligation helps ensure cross-fertilisation between 




2.7 International practice at the program level 
 
Table A2 (Attachment 1) provides a series of examples of specific financial incentives 
programs used in selected European, Asian and Australasian countries. The table 
classifies the objectives of the incentives as follows:11 
 
(A) Assistance targeted at individual firms: 
• strategic capabilities (awareness of the technological and business 
environment); 
• management of tangible technological resources (products, equipment, 
design); 
• management of intangible technological resources (knowledge, skills and 
training); 
• organisational structures and assets; and 
• linkage and networking capabilities (ability to access external knowledge, 
to manage user-producer relations, to form alliances with partners). 
 
(B)  Assistance targeted at groups of firms and technology organisations: 
• linkage and networking capabilities. 
 
While the objectives themselves are fairly clear and discrete, it must be noted 
immediately that many programs, if not the majority, target several or many 
objectives.  
 
While our brief is to devise more effective grant-based incentives for industrial 
technology capability-building and training, we consider it vitally important to 
consider the place of such incentives in the national strategy. Any selection of 
incentives should consider firstly the overall national strategy that they are intended to 
support, secondly the sectors and/or firms/organisations to be targeted for the 
initiative, and only lastly the specific form of the incentive to be used.  
 
In other words we believe that incentives should be chosen on the basis of their 
effectiveness in meeting goals of acknowledged importance, rather than choosing the 
goals to be pursued on the basis of the political attractiveness of the incentives 
required to achieve them. 
                                                 
11  This is a slight modification of the classification scheme used in the Phase 1 report.  
Formatted: Indent: Left:  0.5",
Outline numbered + Level: 1 +
Numbering Style: Bullet + Aligned at: 
0.25" + Tab after:  0.5" + Indent at: 
0.5", Tabs: Not at  0.5"
 18 
3. Review of Financial Incentives for Supporting Technology and 




The observations and findings expressed in Phase 1 of the study have been reinforced 
through the present review of financial incentives for industrial technology 
development. That is, that a well targeted and coordinated set of financial incentives 
for technology and skills enhancement are required to stimulate and assist firms to 
cross the critical technology thresholds that they currently face in Thailand. It is vital 
that firms make this transition in order to achieve sufficient industrial 
competitiveness.  
 
For government policy, the challenge is to achieve an appropriate portfolio of 
incentives that takes account of current weaknesses in the technological capabilities of 
Thai manufacturing firms, of the commercial and technology markets they operate 
within, and the full range of players in the Thai innovation system.  
 
In the light of experiences in other countries the range of incentives likely to be 
required includes:  
 
• generalised incentives (such as provision of basic training and technical 
education for the work force);  
• targeted incentives (such as for acquisition of technological knowledge from 
overseas or negotiating with technology suppliers); 
• incentives for R&D; 
• incentives for basic technology development (e.g. to achieve OEM 
qualification or progress to own-brand products);  
• incentives for specific technology development (to develop or adapt specific 
products for Thai-served markets); 
• incentives for skills development appropriate for absorbing, adapting and 
generally engaging in such technology development  
• links between steps in the incentive system so firms can progress from 
crossing basic technology thresholds to more complex thresholds; and 
• incentives to promote collaboration and knowledge-based cluster formation 
between small and large firms and between firms and support institutions. 
 
This chapter summarises the present status of financial incentives for stimulating 
technology development in Thai firms, identifies some important gaps and provides a 
framework for some revisions to the system. The final chapter outlines the revised 
strategy and offers recommendations for meeting the present challenge.  
 
 
3.2 Reviewing the current incentive system 
 
In order to review the current system of incentives the project team carried out two 
major exercises. The first was to review experiences in other countries and identify 
some benchmarks for good and effective practice for stimulating and assisting firms 
to cross technology thresholds. Major observations from this analysis were introduced 
in the previous chapter. At a more micro-level the review provided some base-line 
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comparisons and benchmarks for developing, administering and evaluating flexible 
grant-based incentive schemes. It is against this backdrop of overseas experiences that 
we carried out the second exercise - a review of the current Thai incentive system.  
 
A set of key questions guided the review. It is important to recognise, however, that 
the purpose was not to review in detail the impact, operations and effectiveness of 
individual schemes but rather to review the collection of schemes as a system and the 
extent to which they collectively contribute to an overall objective. That is, we were 
concerned to identify strengths and weaknesses in the extent of coverage of the 
schemes as a whole and the extent to which clarity and structure of schemes 
contributed to the system as a whole. We were also concerned to identify gaps in their 
coverage, given the current state of technology capability in Thai firms. The objective 
of this analysis was to identify ways that the system as a whole might be adjusted to 
improve flexibility and to respond to the critical technology thresholds currently 
inhibiting international competitiveness. The analysis was based on a series of 
interviews and group discussions with agencies involved with administering the 
current schemes and a review of available documentation on the schemes. Exhibit 7 
illustrates the approach taken by the team. Attachment 2 presents the analytical 





The following section briefly describes the current Thai incentives system. These are 
discussed below on the basis of portfolio management responsibility. While it is 
necessary to discuss these schemes separately there are two points that should be 
noted. Firstly, in practice, firms themselves are not concerned with such portfolio 
distinctions, rather, they are simply concerned with getting on with their daily 
business challenges. Indeed it is precisely these administrative distinctions that often 
inhibit the success of schemes. Secondly, the distinction between schemes that 
support training, design and engineering, research and development are often 

















focused on identifying ways to enhance the system as a whole, rather than simply 
individual schemes, or the administration of specific schemes. 
 
While there are many good aspects of current practices, for the Thai incentives as a 
whole, the diagnostics also reveal a number of shortcomings. 
 
1. Clarity of structure and goals - There is an overlap between some schemes and 
while training schemes are sometimes linked to technology development within 
agencies, there are comparatively weak connection between training and 
technology development offered through other agencies. 
 
2. Effective scheme management - Monitoring and evaluation is variable across 
schemes and there is rather weak systematic coordination across schemes for this 
purpose. Coordination in scheme promotion and delivery is also weak.  
 
3. International benchmarking - Given Thailand’s current state of industrial 
development there is a surprisingly high emphasis on R&D compared to 
enhancing basic engineering and design capabilities. These leaves significant gaps 
for firms struggling to develop their capacity at lower levels of technology 
threshold a critical target in the Thai industrial context. 
 
4. Client and scheme performance - Definitions of eligibility are sometimes variable 
and lead to confusion and limited uptake among smaller firms. While some 
schemes are focusing on supporting groups of firms many of the schemes could be 
more specifically promoting links between large and small firms. 
 
 
3.3 Assessment of current schemes 
 
Skills Development and Training 
 
Thai companies face critical shortages of high quality engineers and in specific skills 
like tool-and-die making. In Thailand, almost forty percent of manufacturing 
establishments provide formal skills training to some members of their workforce, 
either within the firm in in-house training programs, or in courses given by external 
training providers. The incidence of in-service formal training in Thai manufacturing 
appears to be as high as that in Malaysia, and higher than those in other developing 
countries with lower average per capita incomes where broadly comparable training 
data are available.12 However, the distribution of employer-provided formal training is 
very uneven, with the incidence of training is particularly low among SMEs. Nor is 
training focused on innovation. In the 2000 innovation survey, three-quarters of 
medium-large companies surveyed had undertaken no innovation activities, including 
relevant training.  
 
Thailand is in the process of formulating a new Skills Development Act and 
associated Fund. The new Skill Development Act makes provision for pre-
employment training, re-skilling on change of occupation, setting national skills 
                                                 
12  Hong Tan and John Middleton, Demand-Side Training in Thailand, World Bank Institute, m/s, 
n.d. 
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standards and accreditation, and tax relief for training organisations and firms. The 
Act will also establish a restructured Skill Development Fund (SDF) to pool 
government and employers’ contributions, donor funds and income, in order to 
provide loans to trainees and training organisers. Employers will contribute to the 
SDF only if they are unable to arrange the necessary training for themselves. The 
objective is to improve both the skills of workers and of the trainers, particularly for 
in-house training. However, the detail of the SDF remains to be revealed, and much 
rides on its administrative implementation. 
 
Experience in Singapore (Exhibit 9, Attachment 3) and Malaysia (Exhibit 10, 
Attachment 3) and elsewhere suggests that successful SDFs share a range of 
characteristics.13  
 
• They are joint endeavours between government, industry and training providers, 
sustained by industry and government funding and with very strong industry 
involvement in, or control of, their management.  
• They engage a wide range of training providers: public sector organisations, in-
house firm trainers, private trainers, and expert consultants.  
• They tend to provide grants to the trainee firms and loans to the training providers. 
The overriding philosophy is one of ‘firms accessing their own contributions’ in 
the fund.  
• The scope of training schemes supported by Funds is also wide ranging from basic 
literacy to technical, craft, and managerial skills. On the other hand, some 
component schemes are narrowly targeted towards particular types of firm, 
industries or technologies.  
• Recognising that the training ‘industry’ itself may be weak, a crucial element is 
the support for the development of training providers: through accreditation, 
promulgation and application of standards, and financial assistance for training 
infrastructure.  
• A further critical element is the support that successful SDFs provide for skills 
planning and the development of training strategy within firms; and for 
cooperation in training between firms, and within industries, employer groups 
and geographical regions.  
 
The Skills Development Act is a welcome step in this direction but careful 
implementation will be a crucial factor if it is to produce best outcomes. Concerns 
expressed at the December 2001 workshop about the new Thai SDF proposal 
therefore rested on its scope and implementation, not on the legislation itself. Issues 
raised at that workshop included the following.  
 
• Imposing a levy only on the firms that have no training activities might ignore 
firms that had the budget but not the expertise to implement a training strategy. 
The scheme must encourage learning from other firms. To maximise this, large 
companies and MNCs should be involved in the scheme in some way.  
                                                 
13  Hong Tan, Do Training Levies Work? Malaysia’s HRDF and Its Effects on Training and Firm-
Level Productivity, Working Paper, World Bank Institute, July 2001; A. Dar, S.; Canagarajah and 
P. Murphy, Training Levies: Rationale and Evidence from Evaluations, draft m/s, Nov. 2001; S. 
Garrett-Jones, Government Incentives for Technological Skills Development, paper presented to 
‘Skills Development Fund Seminar’, Dept. of Skill Development, Bangkok, 19 Dec. 2001. 
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• The public sector and the bureaucracy should not be the sole ‘drivers’ of the SDF. 
Strong employer representation including the establishment of working 
committee(s) from particular industrial sectors are likely to provide a critical 
success factor.  
• Integration of public sector training will be highly desirable (e.g. vocational and 
university education) as well as substantial involvement of the private sector. The 
SDF should therefore provide incentives to encourage the ‘training service 
industry’ to expand its activities and to improve its quality, rather than simply 
acting as an industry watchdog. In Korea, an intrusive ‘regulatory’ approach to 
firm level training and eligibility skills standards had proven counterproductive 
and failed to produce any increase in training activity by firms.14  
 
Given the pending introduction of the new Skills Development Act and the need to 
ensure subsequent implementation is well aligned with other financial incentives for 
enhancing technology development we emphasise a number of key issues and propose 
some specific recommendations in Chapter Four to achieve that.  
 
 
3.3.1 Administering institutions and schemes  
 
The range of schemes providing financial incentives directed toward enhancing 
Thailand’s industrial technology capabilities is extensive. Through the course of this 
study we identified 47 separate schemes. Many of these had a range of activities with 
different targets and objectives covered within the scheme. Responsibility for the 
administration, promotion, delivery and evaluation of these schemes is spread across 
five separate portfolios of government: the Office of the Prime Minister; the Ministry 
of Finance; The Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment; The Ministry of 
Industry and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. In addition there are a group 
of schemes with independent status, such as the Office of the Thailand Research 
Fund.  
 
A summary of the schemes, the mechanisms through which they operate, their 
objectives, financial commitments and industry ‘take-up’, and monitoring 
mechanisms are summarised in tabular form in a matrix presented in Attachment 4. A 
final column in the matrix summarises the major issues identified for schemes in 
relation to the overall system of incentives. The information in the matrix was 
collected through a series of interviews with senior administrators responsible for the 
schemes following the ‘diagnostics’ outlined above and supplemented with relevant 
documentation available to the project team.  
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Exhibit 8 condenses this information into an illustrative map of the overall system of 
schemes. Although this illustration does not take into account the varying size of 
different schemes, their financial commitments or the numbers of firms assisted it 
does serve to reveal some overall key features of the system.  
 
First, the map illustrates the complexity of the schemes. There are five separate 
ministerial portfolios involved and across these are similar types of schemes offered 
with similar objectives, different reporting requirements, eligibility criteria and 
implementation time-lines.  
 
Secondly, while international experience identifies the value in having a range of 
schemes in place to respond to different needs of firms at different stages of 
technological development the current map illustrates a high degree of fragmentation. 
International benchmarks of successful incentives regimes reflect more integration 
and coordination between schemes with similar objectives, targets and mechanisms.  
 
This complexity and fragmentation leads to two major problems. The first concerns 
the effective promotion of schemes. Potential user firms are unlikely to fully benefit 
from the system as a whole unless they are clearly aware of the goals and the relative 
benefits for their specific needs. Planning for technology development requires a 
reasonably informed scan of the options available. The present structure of schemes 
implies the need for an extensive commitment to coordinated of promotion and 
delivery.  
 
The second problem concerns the need for flexibility to enable firms to move between 
schemes. International benchmarks show that effective client and scheme 
performance rests very much on their capacity to stimulate technology learning in 
firms to enable them to make appropriate technology development choices. This 
implies that it is not so much the number of schemes that are available but the 
accessibility of schemes to firms at times that match their specific and immediate 
needs.  
 
These overall issues associated with effective scheme management, their clarity of 
structure and goals and their performance are addressed with some specific 
recommendation in Chapter 4. The following section briefly discusses the individual 
schemes in the context of these overarching issues. More detailed summaries of the 








The Board of Investment provides a range of mechanisms for encouraging Thai firms 
to engage in R&D activities. The BOI definition of R&D is quite broad and includes 






The mechanisms target two categories of firms: those who carry out R&D as separate 
activities from their regular business and those firms who carry out R&D on behalf of 
other firms. Support is targeted toward firms located in priority investment zones. 
 
Impact: 
According to respondents, private investors are generally not enthusiastic about the 
R&D promotion measures. Among the reasons offered to explain the lack of such 
enthusiasm are: 
 
• a lack of qualified researchers and engineers to conduct R&D in Thailand The 
approval process is cumbersome and requires many steps; 
• concern among some potential applicants that because the BOI definition of R&D 
is quite broad the judgment is to whether an application will be successful will fall 
to an individual official;  
• different incentives for R&D activities, depending on the zone, presents confusion 
between different objectives: that of R&D activities and that of regional 
distribution; 
• other countries such as Singapore and Malaysia offer more attractive incentives 
for firms to invest in R&D including customized incentives such as grants or land.  
 
By international standards, the monitoring and evaluation system is comparatively 
limited. BOI officers usually monitor the scheme once or twice through project 
approval and project expansion approval processes. Annual monitoring is provided 
through submission of balance sheets to BOI. 
 
BOI Unit for Industrial Linkage Development (BUILD)  
 
Administration: 
The Bureau of Investment administers the Unit for Industrial Linkage Development 
(BUILD). The objectives of  BUILD are to: 
  
• stimulate more consumption of local parts and components   
• provide chances for the parts manufacturers to enter new assembly markets   
• help the parts manufacturers understand related businesses   
• encourage more investment in parts and components manufacturing in Thailand 
 
In practice the ‘Vendors Meets Clients’ (VMC) program within BUILD is the only 
scheme with a specific focus on technology development or transfer.  
 
Goals: 
VMC seeks to match vendors/manufacturers with customers/assemblers. The program 
involves taking parts manufacturers to visit assembly plants. This linkage opportunity 
assists the manufacturers to initiate business deals to supply parts and components for 
the plants. As a result, the parts manufacturers learn what the assemblers want, while 
the assemblers learn more about the firms who can supply the parts they require. 
 
Impact: 
So far, 1,000 Thai companies have joined the programme and participated in a total of 
42 visits to large manufacturers. Although this program is not strictly speaking a 
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scheme that offers financial incentive for technology development it is noted here 
because the activity has the potential to stimulate initial demand and offer information 
which might lead to involvement in other schemes.  
 
3.3.3 Ministry of Finance - Department of Revenue 
 
Depreciation allowances for machinery and equipment 
 
Administration 
The Department of Revenue delivers schemes to encourage private sector investment 
in R&D. These schemes include tax concessions on the depreciation of machinery and 
equipment used for R&D. There is no specific monitoring system in place although 
the general taxation provisions allow for accountability. 
 
Goals 
The objective of these schemes is to deliver taxation relief to encourage firms to direct 
machinery and equipment specifically toward R&D activities.  
 
Impact 
One major problem in taking advantage of this provision is the definition of R&D 
machinery and equipment. Firms are uncertain whether their machinery and 
equipment will fit the understanding of the Revenue Department whose officials are 
expected to come and their premise. For example, one firm reported that it had filed 
for such provision 3 years ago and had not yet received an edict on the matter. 
 
200% Tax Concession for R&D Expenditure 
 
Administration: 
Under this measure, firms can apply for a 200 percent deduction of their R&D 
expenditure from their taxable income. However, firms’ R&D projects and agencies 
must be certified by NSTDA to qualify for relief under the scheme. Follow-up project 
evaluation is carried out by NSTDA.  
 
Goals: 
The objective of the scheme is to encourage firms to engage contract research 
agencies to carry out R&D on their behalf and to encourage firm-based R&D where 
in-house  capability can be demonstrated. There is a condition that the firms or 
organisations contracted to carry out the R&D must be included in a list of agencies 
approved by MOF and NSTDA. This latter feature of the scheme is different from the 
practice in other countries where firms incurring their own R&D expenses are 
automatically eligible for a tax concession. Approved agencies include subordinate 
research units or spin-off firms of a conglomerate; independent research units or 
companies; universities, labs and government research organizations. 
 
Impact:  
By the end of 2000, tax deductions had been granted to 36 firms/organisations. Most 
of companies benefiting from the tax concession are subordinate research units or 
companies. Only a very small number of independent companies or research units 
receive the R&D tax concession.  
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According to respondents factors contributing to lack of firms taking advantage of the 
tax concession include: 
• the approval process is cumbersome and takes considerable time; 
• lack of clarity in definitions - according to some firms, the definition of R&D 
activities is not clear and they are not certain what kind of expenditure will 
actually qualify for the deduction; 
• design and engineering activities, essential for many firms in developing their 
R&D potential are not included in the Revenue Department 's definition of R&D;  
• the requirement that only R&D expenditures paid to the listed organisations in the 
MOF announcement are eligible for tax concession does not encourage firms to 
carry out R&D within their own firms - some firms have overcome this separating 
out their R&D section from the parent company and applying for their R&D 
section to be listed.  
 
Deduction/exemption of R&D machinery import duties. 
 
Administration: 
The Customs Department provides for deduction/exemption from import duties for 
R&D machinery and equipment.  
 
Goals: 
The objective of this scheme is to promote R&D by reducing the import cost in 
acquiring machinery or equipment necessary for R&D. Import duty relief covers: 
scientific tools; R&D chemicals; environmentally sound machinery; computer and 
electronics parts; training and testing equipment. 
 
Impact: 
Comments received through the present study indicate that the approval process for 
deductions takes considerable time. 
 
150% tax concession for training expenditure 
 
Administration: 
The Revenue Department also provides a 150 percent tax concession for expenditure 
on employee training with the Department of Skill Development for in-house training 
approved by the department. 
 
Goals: 
The tax concession is designed to generally encourage more spending on training 
courses by the private sector rather than to specifically enhance technological and 
production capabilities. In its present form the scheme provides generalised training 
support. Although generalised skills development is a critical activity for countries 
such as Thailand there is a need to specifically targeted training toward enhancing 
skills for undertaking technological activities such as design and engineering and 
quality management.  
 
Impact: 
The agency reported that involvement in the program has been declining over the past 
three years, in terms of the number of firms involved, the number of courses offered 
and the number of training participants.  
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3.3.4 Independent agencies 
 
Thailand Research Fund - R&D Grants (TRF) 
 
Administration: 
The Thailand Research Fund was established as an independent agency with the 
mandate to provide research grants to the private sector. TRF coordinators, mostly 
recruited from universities, assist in identifying appropriate firms and in preparing 
applications for grants. A small team of experts is appointed to assess the proposal 
and monitor its progress if it is successful. Because of the ‘selective’ project 
development process most applications are successful. TRF coordinators manage the 
scheme and monitor progress through six month visits. A project planning tool for 
project and overall schemes evaluation. Administration of the programme is 
maintained within 10 percent of total annual expenditure. 
 
Objectives: 
Two programmes are offered to support R&D activities for production processes and 
product development by allocating grants to SMEs. Grants up to the value of Baht 
50,000 are available to firms who must match the grant by contributing to at least 50 
percent of the total project cost. Activities must be carried out in collaboration with 
public sector researchers. The support is targeted to industry sub-sectors identified by 
government as a high priority. The fund has recently introduced a programme to build 




TRF currently administers 153 projects and has delivered Baht 100 million to firms 
over the past eight years. Delivery of grants to the private sector is currently limited 
by: a) the 50 percent matching requirement; b) matching grants do not qualify for 
relief through the 200 percent tax concession scheme, unless they are carried out in 
one of the approved agency or firms; c) limited awareness of the scheme and 
identifying firms with the appropriate capacity to carry out projects.  
 
 
3.3.5 Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment 
 
Revolving Fund for Technological Research and Development (RTDRF) 
 
Administration: 
The Research and Technology Development Revolving Fund provides two 
programmes of financial support in the form of soft loans.  
 
Goals: 
The objective of the loans is to reduce financial risk and stimulate investment in the 
commercialisation of R&D results. Two programs have different targets. One 
provides soft loans for amounts up to 10 million baht targeted for technological R&D. 
These attract an interest rate of four percent per year with maturity required within 
eight years. A second program provides larger amounts for process improvement and 
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commercialisation, up to 20 million baht per project. These attract an interest rate of 
six percent per year and maturity is required within 10 years. 
 
Impact: 
The Fund has not attracted much enthusiasm from the private sector. Since 1988, 47 
projects from SMEs have been supported with a combined value of 455.088 million 
baht. Reasons identified for limited impact include the following: 
1) the approval process takes more than one year to complete; 
2) there is limited awareness of these scheme as it is is not strongly promoted; 
3) there is shortage of personnel directly responsible for fund management;  
4) the available funds, conditions and interest rate are not sufficiently attractive; 
5) there are other similar funds available such as through NSTDA; 
6) many firms find the reporting and evaluation process too burdensome; 
7) SMEs have difficulty meeting the collateral needed while larger firms find the 
amount of loan available to be too small. 
 
Innovation Development Fund 
 
Administration: 
The IDF is a new programme established in 1998 as part of a package to stimulate 
innovation and increase the competitiveness of Thai firms. It is currently under the 
administration of NSTDA. The fund provides the private sector with financial support 
(grants, soft loans) and technical and business advisory service through Business 
Innovation Projects, Business Start-up Projects, and Strategic Projects.  
 
An office oversees the management of the Fund and an Executive Committee carries 
responsibility for the functioning of the Office. NSTDA, the Ministry of Finance and 
NESDB provide the legal framework within which IDF is established. Financial 
support is available through a program of grants and loans. The IDF mandate also 
allows it to make investments in selected projects. In addition IDF can provide 
technical support for project or process development and for financial and business 
activities. Monitoring is carried out through established performance measures, 
however, because the program is still in a development phase full program evaluation 
has not yet occurred. 
 
Goals: 
There are four key objectives in IDF’s approach: 
• to establish an operational system to provide definitions of ‘innovation projects’; 
• to promote awareness and appreciation of the benefits derived from innovation; 
• to develop strategic projects with the potential to have major impact on specific 
sectors; and  
• to work with potential innovators to develop innovation project proposals. 
 
Project support is targeted toward projects that qualify as having a clear ‘innovation 
action’ such as the introduction of a new product, new service or process as well as 
new ways of supporting and servicing products or processes. Projects must also 
demonstrate technical and business feasibility. One of the roles of the fund is to assist 
firms to develop proposals to the stage where such feasibility can be demonstrated.  
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Impact: 
The program is still in early stages of development. In the first year of its operations 
(2000) 62 proposals were received ‘in various stages of development’. In 2001 IDF 
staff were engaged with the development of 26 projects. Although the IDF was 
intended to provide a driving force for large and extensive innovation projects 
involving groups or clusters of firms, its operations to date have been comparatively 
modest. However, more recently the program has been expanded and given a higher 
priority by the Government. By mid 2002, 109 firms had applications registered for 
support. 
 
The majority of funds are allocated toward ‘upgrading innovation’ (1,180 million 
Baht - 83 percent of funds); ‘building an innovation culture’ is allocated 105 million 
Baht (7.4 percent) and ‘building innovation organisations’ is allocated 135 million 
Baht (9.5 percent). Administration takes up approximately 9.5 percent of funds.  
 
During its first year of activities the Chairman noted a number of features that would 
require attention in future development of the scheme. These included: 
• a need to be more proactive in seeking out new projects and provide assistance in 
developing proposals; 
• a need to provide an appropriate match of technical and financial support; 
• a need to establish a database of technical and business experts to assist in project 
assessment; and 
• a need to enhance networking and cluster formation between organisations 
engaged in related activities. 
 
NSTDA  - Department of Industrial and Business Development 
 
Administration: 
NSTDA is responsible for the Department of Industrial and Business Development. 
Interested companies can apply to participate in the program. NSTDA’s Industrial 
Technology Advisors (ITA) will visit firms to assess firms’ needs and identify skills 
and information lacking in firms (e.g. good quality management system, business 
plan, or marketing). The ITA then presents a draft project proposal to assist firms 
develop a capacity to innovate. Once the project has been approved, the ITAs recruit 




The overall objective is to support and stimulate the private sector to adapt 
technology, promote R&D and innovation for new products and processes in the 
manufacturing sector. 
 
MTEC, BIOTEC and NECTEC 
 
NSTDA is also responsible for MTEC, BIOTEC and NECTEC that provide 
technology services, and grants directed toward projects within universities and the 
private sector. One of the issues associate with these latter schemes is that there is 
some overlap with similar schemes offered through TRF and more recently IDF. 
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These two programs are quality management programs. The schemes are monitored 
by an auditor. As a precautionary measure applicants have to place a deposit with 
NSTDA at the beginning of the program to guarantee they will devote time to make 
the activities successful. 
 
Goals: 
TFQS provides a beginning standard of quality management, created by NSTDA 
staff, which is lower than ISO. The scheme is targeted toward firms requiring 
certification for ISO, GMP or TQM. Firms who are not ready for ISO will be advised 
to apply for TFQS at the beginning. NSTDA will grant 50 percent of support required 
under the TFQS scheme but to a maximum of Baht 30,000. Financial support for 
STQC is not provided. 
 
The Company Directed Technology Development Programme (CD) 
 
Administration: 
The CD programme was established within NSTDA to provide grants and soft loans 
to enable SMEs to invest in R&D for commercialization. Monitoring is carried out 
every six months by ITAs with assistance from other experts 
 
Goals: 
Funds are targeted toward building or improving laboratory facilities, upgrading 
technology, or new product development. Soft loans are available for the development 
of new production processes or new products, building or improving laboratory 
facilities, upgrading technology, or utilisation of scientific and technological R&D 
capabilities existing within private and government laboratories. The maximum 
amount of loan available is 20 million baht but the amount must not be more than 50 
percent of the total cost of the project. Interest rate is currently half that offered by the 
banks, but includes an overhead fee. Grants have now been removed from the scheme 




Apart from the limited amount of fund available per project the condition that the firm 
has to finance at least half of the project presents a formidable hurdle for many firms. 
Another major difficulty with soft loans is the condition that the financial institution 
has to guarantee the principal payment. Financial institutions are not very active in 
lending out R&D soft loans because of this additional risk. Between 1992 and 2001 
the scheme provided support for 89 projects involving 77 firms.  
 
Industrial Technology Assistance Programme (ITAP) 
 
ITAP, previously known as the Consultancy Services introduces experts (freelance or 
retired university professors) to firms to provide advice on technology and product 
development. The scheme also offers project evaluation service and financial support 
for up to 50 percent of the total cost of expenses. Evaluation is carried out during the 
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beginning of the project with interim monitoring that incorporates comments from 




ITAP has the objective of enhancing the capability for production technology of 
SMEs by supporting Thai industry to use technical consultants. 
 
Impact: 
ITAP has supported 217 projects involving 184 firms. 
 
Support for Technology Acquisition and Mastery Programme (STAMP) 
 
Administration: 
STAMP provides financial support and arrangements for factory visit abroad for key 
staff within SMEs. Participating firms have to prepare and deliver a presentation to 
the host firms. Evaluation is carried out independently by the University of the Thai 
Chamber of Commerce. 
 
Goals: 
The objective is to assist firms discover new technology. Inbound and outbound 
missions are organized to introduce technology to firms. The scheme provides 
financial support for air fares. 
 
Impact: 
The emphasis on travel introduces a controversial issue that STAMP is predominantly 
a ‘fun trip’ rather than for serious technology development. STAMP has provided 
support for 227 firms. Evaluations carried out by the University of the Thai Chamber 
of Commerce have been positive. 
 
Intellectual Property Services (IPS) 
 
NSTDA, through the IPS, provides legal advice and service in intellectual property 
rights protection. The Intellectual Property institute at Chulalongkorn University 
provides registration service and organizes seminars related to intellectual property. 
IPS has provided support for 37 projects involving 35 firms. 
 
NSTDA Investment Centre (NIC) 
 
NIC supports the development of joint ventures with the private sector to invest in 
technology identified as ‘vital to the country’ e.g. ISP, Distance Training, GMO 
analysis. The proportion of investment from NSTDA varies case by case but can not 
be more than 49 percent of the overall activity. 
 
Summary Issues for the NSTDA schemes 
 
Goals: 
NSTDA primarily targets its schemes toward support for SMEs estimated to be 
around 80,000 firms. The client base has grown over the past five years. Demand 
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continues to increase but the availability of funds does not appear to be sufficient to 
meet the growing demand. 
 
Impact: 
The budget is allocated scheme by scheme, which does not currently allow for funds 
to be transferred from one scheme to another. Recovery of loan funds has remained at 
100 percent. In the process of project selection, ITAs play an important role in 
selecting, analyzing and devising the project. Critical question that ITAs are asked to 
answer concern whether the projects are in line with strategies (to promote firms 
bringing technology for R&D and innovation). 
 
NSTDA promotes its schemes through direct mail, exhibition participation, seminars 
and training. In 2002, NSTDA began utilising a PR company to promote the schemes 
through newspaper (publishing a ‘scoop of success stories’), TV and radio.  
 
The Thai Institute of Scientific and Technological Research 
 
The Thai Institute of Scientific and Technological Research provides laboratory 
services, research and development services and technology transfer services. These 
services are available to the private sector on a fee for service basis. 
 
 
3.3.6 Ministry of Industry 
 
The Thailand Productivity Institute  
 
The Thailand Productivity Institute provides public and in-house training. The 
objective is to enhance human resource development for productivity improvement. 
The cost for delivery of training is subsidised. 
 
The National Food Institute  
 
The National Food Institute provides training and laboratory services for supporting 
firms in that sector. 
 
The Thai Automotive Institute 
 
The Thai Automotive Institute has a scheme for supporting supplier development 
directed primarily toward SMEs. The scheme provides funding for group consulting 
to the value of 200,000 baht per factory. Support for individual firm consulting is also 
available which supports 75 percent of the cost with a Baht 200,000 ceiling. 
 
The Electrical and Electronics Institute 
 
The Electrical and Electronics Institute provides product testing and calibration 
services and training services for firms in this sector. 
 
The National Institute of Metrology 
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The National Institute of Metrology provides technical assistance and measurement 
testing services. 
 
The Thai-German Institute 
 
Administration: 
The Thai-German Institute was established with a ten year grant from the Thai 
government. The government also supports individual training projects. The Thai-
German Institute provides in-kind support through the provision of experts, 
machinery and training. TGI promotes their program through their own marketing 
staff and carries out routine customer satisfaction surveys. These surveys evaluate 
content of the modules, equipment and machinery, trainers and TGI management. 
TGI also monitors its operations by creating efficiency indicators such as monthly 
operation efficiency and customer satisfaction and sales per staff or per true delivery 
or per supporting staff. In addition the institute is monitored and evaluated by external 
agencies - usually every two years. 
 
Goals: 
The main objective of the TGI activities are to train technicians in advanced 
manufacturing technology and to provide industrial consultancy services for firms. 
 
Impact: 
The demand for TGI service has increased in CAD-CAM and computerization related 
courses. However, TGI staff report they are not certain whether some of the other 
technical training offered suits the changing demand of their Thai clients. Main 
constraints identified for the program include: 
1. the relevance and level of knowledge/ technology of trainees 
2. ability of employees to gain leave to attend the training; 
3. a high training cost due to TGI’s high operation cost (approximately 70 
percent and up to 90 percent when including depreciation cost). 
 
Department of Industrial Promotion (DIP) 
 
Administration: 
The Department of Industrial Promotion has various schemes providing grants to 
firms in hiring consultants to improve firms’ productivity. These schemes include: 
Project 13; Consultancy Fund (CF), ITB and MDIC. 
 
DIP - Project 13 Goals: 
Project 13 starts every fiscal year. Interested firms have to submit their application to 
participate in the program during certain period of time. The total number of 
applications submitted to Project 13 is 400 firms. Those 400 firms will be allocated to 
institutes sub-contracting consultancy work from the Ministry, mainly university 
professors that are interested to become consultants of the program. The consultancy 
is carried as group work, not individually. The period of the project is strictly limited 
to 6 months. The government fully covers the consultancy fees. 
 
DIP - Consultancy Fund Administration: 
Project development starts with the diagnosis of problems and needs of clients by 
experienced DIP officers. Then, a TOR will be drafted and a bidding process is put in 
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place to appoint consultants. Grant are available for up to 20% of the total budget 
value but to a maximum value of 200,000 baht. 
 
Evaluation is provided through a requirement that consultant teams submit a progress 
report every quarter to the approval committee. The approval committee also visits 
firms participating in the project to identify any problems. When the project finishes, 
an approval committee, consisting of one DIP official and one expert assess whether 
the consultant has delivered the work according to the TOR. 
 
DIP - Consultancy Fund Goals 
The Consultancy Fund (CF) was established in 2000 to provide consultancy services 
to SMEs. The programme provides financial support of up to 50 percent of consultant 
fee but to a maximum value of 200,000 baht. There are eleven regional Industrial 
Promotion Centers involved with delivering the program. 
 
DIP - Consultancy Fund Impact: 
Between 1996-1999 there was a total budget of Baht 45.5 million. However, only 
Baht 5.2 million (11.43 percent) was granted to 48 firms.  The majority of services 
(90 percent) were related to management rather than technology - mainly consultancy 
for ISO 9000, QC or TQM.  
 
CF’s target is approximately 100 factories per year, with 40 firms in central area and 
60 firms in the regions. Criteria for firms to be eligible for the program is that they 
should be SME in the manufacturing sector with more than 50 percent of Thai 
shareholders. The trend of demand is increasing slowly. There is some overlap with 
the ITB.  
 
Annual budget for CF is 15.5 million baht. However in 2000, 5.2 million baht was 
granted to the private sector (33.7 percent of the budget allocated). This increased to 
7.65 million baht (49.4 percent of the budget allocated) in 2001. Administration cost 
is 10.5 percent of the total budget allocated. 
 
DIP - Invigorating Thai Business (ITB) 
 
The Invigorating Thai Business Program offers grants directed toward SMEs to assist 
them solve technical and management problems. Grants are provided to cover expert 
fees. The scheme is similar to the CF program. 
 
DIP - Management Development Program (MDIC) 
 
There are five components to the MDIC program. Modernisation of production; 
technology management planning and acquisition of technology; strategic planning; 
financial management; and marketing. The program provides up to 170 person days 
of consultancy. Firms must pay one third of the cost out of a maximum of 900,000 







DIP - Training Fund 
 
The DIP Training Fund provides grants up to the value of 150,000 baht to cover 50 
percent of training costs to eligible SMEs. 
 
 
DIP - Productivity Improvement Loan  
 
The Ministry of Industry, with support from BOT, has financial assistance in the form 
of soft loans through IFCT and EXIM Bank. The soft loans are for the purpose of 
improving firms’ productivity and machinery. The soft loan interest rate is 1 percent 
with maturity period of five to seven years. The total amount loaned must not exceed 
200 million baht. 
 
 
3.3.7 Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 
 
Department of Skill Development - Skills Development Fund 
 
Administration: 
This fund seeks to promote training for both skilled and non-skilled workers. The 
fund provides soft loans for trainees at 1 percent interest rate. Funds are available to 
cover expenses incurred for personnel and associated expenses.  
 
A new draft Skill Development Act is currently before parliament. The proposed new 
Act will allow for the transfer of funds from the previous Skill Development Fund. It 
will essentially operate through levying an amount of up to 1 percent of payroll on 
firms that do not carry out adequate training as determined by the Ministry of Labour. 
The Act will therefore act as an incentive to encourage firms to provide training by 
penalising them if they do not do so.  
 
Goals: 
The training schemes will engage large firms and SMEs in collaborative training 
approaches, draw together industry and public sector involvement and engage a wide 
range of training providers. They are also intended to support a wide range of 
schemes, from basic literacy to technical, craft and managerial skills. Some will be 
targeted toward particular sectors and technologies and some will be targeted toward 
accreditation of training providers. 
 
Potential impact: 
The draft Act is not specific on how these features will be incorporated in practical 
delivery of training. Given the importance of delivering appropriate training to ensure 
industrial technology development in Thailand can proceed we offer some specific 
recommendations for the implementation of programs under the new Act in the 







3.4 Weaknesses and limitations in the present framework  
 
There is a wide range of incentives for technology development in place in Thailand. 
However, the current range of incentive schemes described above reflect a policy 
perspective that has not kept pace with the demands of global environments. 
International experiences reflect the need to target incentives where they will have 
maximum impact. This implies targeting particular types or groups of firms and 
targeting the specific technology thresholds relevant to their current levels of 
technology capabilities.  
 
Some general areas of weakness can be observed from the above overview and the 
summary of schemes provided in Attachment 4. 
 
The main elements of these weaknesses are summarised below. 
• Current R&D incentives are inhibited by eligibility criteria that supports the ‘top 
end’ of firm technology capabilities but leaves gaps for firms struggling to 
develop their capacity at lower technology thresholds. This ‘gap’ in the current 
incentives regime is illustrated in Exhibit 9. 
• Given Thailand’s current state of industrial development there is a surprisingly 
high emphasis on supporting R&D compared to the attention given to enhancing 
basic engineering and design capabilities. 
• Those schemes that do address this level of technology development are faced 
with increasing demands for support from firms but have insufficient resources 
and budget flexibility to adequately meet such demands.  
• While some schemes provide matching grants for research and development the 
private sector contributions are often excluded from attracting R&D tax 
concessions. 
• There is an overlap between some schemes which can lead to confusion among 
firms that are targeted by such schemes. 
• Schemes that address training are sometimes linked to technology development 
schemes delivered by the same agencies but there is far less connection between 
training schemes with technology development (or training) offered through other 
agencies.  
• At a general level the grants and loans schemes are either too small to provide 
sufficient incentive to large firms and the matching fund requirements too 
stringent for small firms. 
• There is some rigidity in the system that does not allow for firms to progress 
through ‘incremental steps in developing their technology capabilities. 
• There remains a strong focus on supply driven incentives compared to incentives 
that stimulate demand for technology upgrading. 
• There is an apparent recognition of the need to support groups of firms and in 
particular links between large and small firms, but the many of the schemes could 
be more specifically and aggressively turned toward this objective. 
• Monitoring and evaluation is variable across schemes15 and there is rather weak 
systematic coordination across schemes for this purpose. 
• Cooperation and coordination in scheme promotion and delivery is also weak. 
 
                                                 
15  However, new budget procedures are likely to introduce much more stringent requirements on 
the monitoring and evaluation of public sector expenditures. 
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3.5 The Challenge for Thailand 
 
Far from retreating from public investment in technology development and training, 
the challenge for Thailand is to find efficient and locally acceptable means of 
underwriting technology development and learning within private firms. Solutions 
will require support for collaborative strategies among the whole range of ‘knowledge 
system’ players as well as for firm-based activity. Success will deliver public benefits 
to the country: benefits measured in terms of skills and experience in technology, as 
well as monetary return. Failure to come to terms with the necessity of developing 
functioning ‘knowledge networks’ will see Thailand fall further behind economies 
such as Singapore and Taiwan in terms of national industrial technology capability 
and skills, and in its ability to compete on the basis of ‘knowledge’ rather than on 
other factors of production. 
 
 






A further challenge will be to devise ways to use appropriate financial support 
mechanisms, including grants to private companies where these are warranted. 
Contestability (competition) and transparency of funding are essential. Support 
schemes must be complementary and well coordinated and delivered and well 
understood by firm managers. Options such as ‘one stop shops’ and contracting the 
private sector to deliver the schemes have been canvassed through the present project, 
and specific proposals for rationalisation and coordination of government support are 




























Gap in the Current
Incentives Regime
= technology incentive scheme
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3.6 Developing a revised framework 
 
We see three key propositions or ‘strategies’ that together provide a framework for 
revising and improving the effectiveness of present system of financial incentives.  
 
Proposition 1: Government financial incentives should support the full range of 
technology capability building activities within the firm in an integrated manner. 
 
This proposition recognises that Thai government financial incentives for technology 
capability building and training are not currently as comprehensive or as effective as 
firms require. Firms’ technological capabilities comprise three interlocking sets of 
competencies (skills, technical knowledge and organisation): production capability 
(management and engineering), project execution (feasibility, training, execution) and 
innovation capability (new product development, R&D). Effective incentive schemes 
should therefore support the full range of these activities and integrate these activities 
in a way that takes account of how firms operate.  
 
A notable gap in current incentives lies in the area of networking and cooperation, 
between firms both around technology development and in relation to training. Some 
incentives should specifically encourage cooperation in technology development and 
training between firms (including between local and between local and foreign 
firms), and between firms and public sector institutions such as universities.  
 
Well-targeted and comprehensive incentives will be ineffective if hampered by poor 
definition of eligibility (in activities or clients), inadequate resources, and poor 
administration and delivery. We consider that the management of current incentive 
schemes need to be more integrated in terms of activities supported, and more 
aggressively delivered to firms. This does not necessarily require consolidating all 
existing schemes under one or two government agencies, but it does require 
consolidating their promotion, monitoring and evaluation. 
 
Proposition 2: Incentives must be targeted at those industry sectors, firms and 
activities that are likely to provide the greatest public benefit. 
 
At a strategic level, the Thai government should develop criteria (‘targets’) for 
selecting the candidate industry sectors, firms and activities that are most likely to 
offer substantial social returns to any grants handed out. A critical factor in delivering 
maximum impact will be to target technology thresholds (irrespective of sector) that 
are creating the greatest bottlenecks for technology upgrading. In the case of 
Thailand the evidence is that this is not at the level where firms are already engaged 
with R&D, but at the level where firms need to build their capacity for design and 
engineering capabilities. This observation was emphasised in Phase 1 of this study. It 
is further reinforced in this Phase of the study. The strength of demand for financial 
assistance sought by firms for developing these capabilities is considerably more than 
the level of take-up of incentives for schemes that predominantly designed to promote 
R&D would suggest.  
 
The criteria for targeting should emphasise development where target sectors, target 
firms and target activities intersect and where firms themselves have already made 
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progress toward enhancing technology capability. Criteria for achieving this is 
elaborated further below. 
 
Targeting industry sectors: 
 
Key sectors are those where levels of technology are higher than those currently 
common in Thai industry but not at the cutting edge. This would permit: (a) 
technology upgrading when Thailand enters the sector but at a level that can be 
accommodated with achievable (if still substantial) investments in further training; (b) 
ready access to technical knowledge that is already codified or potentially available 
through learning and know-how gained through closer interaction with other firms; 
(c) an ability to upgrade technology capabilities for process engineering and limited 
R&D development (localisation of the product); and, (d) allow limited engagement 
with basic research where it can serve to embed firms in research and development 
processes and link them to innovative clusters.  
 
There should be an emphasis on sectors where there are substantial existing markets 
are clearly identified niche markets, preferably both international and domestic, to 
permit increased exports and import substitution. But essentially where there is 
limited competition from firms in other developing nations to avoid potential glutting 
of the market. There should also be an emphasis given to sectors where there is a 
comparative advantage in non-technological factors of production, such as geographic 
location, opportunities for tourism and cultural factors.  
 
Where possible, areas to target should be in those sectors where there is a 
demonstrated willingness on the part of existing MNCs to operate in Thailand and 
give business to Thai suppliers at segments of their supply chains that would allow 
local firms to engage in initial technological upgrading and lay the foundations for 
further upgrading in the future. 
 
In general, these criteria imply moving into mature industries at positions in their 
supply chains that do not rely simply on low factor costs – e.g. of labour and raw 
materials – but also provide entrees to technological sophistication beyond those 




Local SMEs are a clearly a first priority for support. It is appropriate to fund 
activities in SMEs that would not be supported in larger, more technology-capable 
companies. There is strong argument for a new scheme that is far more accessible to 
SMEs. There is also a place for incentives (but not necessarily grants) targeted at 
multinational corporations, to encourage them to assist local companies in 
technology development and training.  
 
For local firms criteria for eligibility requirements to receive incentives should be 
based on: (a) the introduction of updated (but not cutting-edge) technologies; (b) 
operating in industries with good commercial prospects; (c) demonstrated commercial 
probity of owners and managers with an outward focused approach to innovation and 
marketing; (d) sufficient initial technical capabilities within firm to support 
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upgrading; and (e) potential for transferring knowledge and skills to other firms and 
industries. 
For MNCs, eligibility requirements should be based on: (a) those MNC who introduce  
more sophisticated (although probably not cutting-edge) technologies than are 
currently in general use; (b) where these technologies offer good prospects for 
diffusion to other industries (act as leading sectors), thereby spreading technological 
upgrading; (c) “good citizenship” in the sense of a high probability that firms 




The criteria for targeting types of activities should emphasise: a) those types of 
incentives that they require levels of technological skill above those currently 
common in Thailand; b) those that can be taught locally (and to local workers) at a 
reasonable cost and in a reasonable span of time; those that are flexible and 
potentially applicable to a variety of firms and industrial sectors. This should allow 
for the promotion of potential indigenous entrepreneurship by those who are trained 
and wish to go into business independently, and serve to avoid workers becoming so 
highly specialised that the value of their skills is destroyed if their initial employer 
fails for some reason. 
Phase One of the present study, identified the need to target technology thresholds in 
Thai firms toward stimulating demand and building capacity in firms for raising 
design and engineering capabilities. However, within this overall national objective 
the nature of critical technology thresholds for firms in Thailand will vary in different 
sectors. It will therefore be necessary to investigate priority industry clusters very 
carefully to ensure that financial incentive scheme activities are designed, promoted, 
and delivered at targets most likely to maximise benefit from the investment. This is 
discussed further in the concluding chapter of this report. 
In addition and complementary to the above, training and formal skill development 
are clearly first priority activities for incentive support. This includes support to assist 
firms in formulating their technology and training strategies. However, training 
support should be targeted toward those same technology thresholds addressed by 
other schemes. A key to achieving this is to provide flexibility for firms to sort out 
this matching process themselves. In short, this implies building on the efforts 
already underway within the private sector. This challenge is taken up with some 
specific recommendations below. 
 
The point of these criteria is that maximum impact and efficiency of the incentive 
system is most likely to be realised when the schemes target the intersection between 
key sectors, firms and activities. This is illustrated in Exhibit 10.  
 
 
Proposition 3: The choice of particular form of incentive (tax incentive, loan, 
grant) is a tactical decision that must take account of local circumstances. 
 
We consider that the particular form of financial incentive provided to companies is 
not in itself a critical factor in the effectiveness of the incentive. However, in the Thai 
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context, providing grants to companies would overcome some of the problems that 
firms have with raising collateral, with the definition and administration of tax 
incentives, and with cash flow problems.  
 
 




We note that most industrialising countries have a portfolio of incentives that include 
grants to private companies. Like other financial incentives, these grants are justified 
where the activity is particularly high risk (long-term R&D), where there are 
substantial spillovers from the firm (eg. of knowledge or trained people), or where a 
firm is too small to resource the activity on its own.  
 
We therefore consider that there is strong argument for delivering financial assistance 
to SMEs in the form of grants, ‘vouchers’ or ‘innovation credits’, or by other means 
that do not require large ‘up front’ payments by the firm.  
 
Obviously, the process for targeting, awarding and administering grants must be a fair 
one. Contestability (competition) for funds and transparency of funding guidelines 
and administration are essential. To reduce the risk of funds being misapplied, 
agencies must be able and sufficiently resourced to allow them to assess that firms are 
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4. A Revised System of Incentives for Enhancing Technological 
Capability in Thai firms 
 
The analysis of the present incentive systems and mechanisms for skill development 
and technological upgrading leads to a number of key recommendations. These are 
presented below under five key headings. The final section (4.6) sets out a plan for 
action by key agencies to implement these recommendations. 
 
4.1 Revising financial incentives for skills development and training  
 
A first issue for maximising the impact of incentives for skills and development 
concerns changing the behaviour of firms towards training. The existing tax deduction 
for training, ‘typically subsidises the types and volumes of training that would 
probably have been undertaken in any case.’16 Exempting firms on the basis of their 
existing training activities (with no other assistance from the SDF) would provide 
even less leverage on firms. It would not seem to give the SDF the opportunity to 
improve the level or quality of training within these firms.  
 
Large firms in particular carry out a disproportional share of training and are also in a 
position to assist SMEs that they have commercial relations with. However, they fall 
largely outside the purview of the proposed SDF. The potential for the diffusion of 
knowledge for technology development to smaller firms will be enhanced if larger 
firms are part of training networks. 
 
Recommendation 1: 
Large firms should be encouraged to become actively involved in training. This 
could be achieved through their representation on the SDF Board and through 
their involvement in collaborative training arrangements. For example the new 
Skills Development Fund could target specific incentives for in-house training by 
MNCs for staff of other companies to allow them to act as training suppliers for 
their industry. 
 
In the Singapore case, noted in Exhibit 11, partnerships were established with MNCs 
to create industry specific training centres. This approach could be adopted by the 
SDF as a mechanism to enhance the diffusion of skills from large (including foreign) 
to smaller firms.  
 
A second issue concerns establishing an effective way to reach smaller firms. 
Evidence from the Malaysian HRDF suggests that the scheme has worked best for 
large firms; attempting to target the smaller firms through the combination of 
mandatory and optional levies has been ineffective. Several years after the start of the 
scheme, almost half of the eligible firms in the 50-100 employee category had not 
registered with the HRDF for the levy and, of those that had, only around half claimed 
any reimbursement for training activities.17 If this pattern is repeated in Thailand, the 
new SDF scheme will fail, since it encompasses primarily the smaller firms. This is 
partly a question of adequate resources for enforcing compliance and partly one of the 
scope of the scheme. 
                                                 
16 Phase 1 report, p. 89. 
17 This was documented in the Phase 1 report, p. 90. 
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Mechanisms to reduce cash/cost outlays by SMEs appear effective in securing their 
participation. In certain cases the Malaysian HRDF, for example, makes direct 
(partial) payment to a training provider on behalf of a firm. 
 
The SDF Board should have sufficient degree of autonomy to modify the scope and 
priorities of the scheme as needs arise and the skills base of companies develop. For 
example the SDF schemes should allow for direct payment to be made to training 
providers on behalf of small firms.  
 
The SDF schemes should specifically and aggressively also target groups of SMEs for 
joint training. This could be implemented through group training activities, activities 
through employer organisations, industry groups, and TNC supplier chains. This 
would enable small firms with the need and will to undertake training, but not the 
capability to offer training, to ‘redraw their levy paid into the fund – in the form of 
targeted training. The SDF should give some consideration to providing matching 
funds to the levy to generate a sustainable and effective national training scheme. 
Existing training schemes, such as those offered through the Productivity Institute 
have been moving in this direction. These approaches should be strengthened both in 
terms of quantity and quality. 
 
Recommendation 2: 
As the SDF develops there should be mechanisms to ‘hold the hand’ of smaller 
companies by setting up training courses and funding company employees to 
attend them. This could be achieved through cash contracts or grants to training 
suppliers (who could be large firms, universities, GRIs) to provide specific 
courses for groups of SMEs. There is no point in funding companies if the 
required training courses do not exist – parallel support for the development of the 
‘training industry’ is also essential. 
 
A key challenge for effective skills and development concerns improving flexibility to 
enable the SDF to respond to different priorities over time. Schemes such as those in 
Malaysia and Singapore have changed in scope, levy rates, reimbursement rates and 
priority training areas over the life of the schemes. For example, the schemes initially 
focused on generic skills (even from the primary or secondary curriculum) and 
evolved to fund (in addition) higher level, more specialised vocational skills.  
 
Commenting on the Malaysian Fund, the consultants for Phase 1 noted: ‘the ability to 
respond flexibly to specific plans and projects at the firm level may be an important 
means of supporting demand-driven training development, but it also indicates the 
importance of informed administrative support for the operation of such services’.18 In 
order to improve flexibility and more effectively draw SMEs into SDF training 
schemes, the SDF should consider introducing a system of training ‘credits’. These 
could be allocated to firms who could spend them with any registered training 
provider (including MNCs with the capacity to deliver appropriate training) over a 
given period of time.  
 
                                                 
18 Phase 1 report, p. 92. 
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There is already evidence that MNCs and local LSEs can provide, and are willing to 
contribute to, the development of ‘train the trainer’ modules for delivery by Thai 
training institutes. For example, BOI have recently received support from firms in the 
electronics sector to create six day training modules for employees of local supplier 
firms. This suggests that models for involving large firms in the delivery and the 
development of training such as those used so effectively in Singapore could be 
equally effective in Thailand. 
 
Recommendation 3: 
Assistance with the analysis of training needs, development of training strategies 
and identification of appropriate training providers appears absolutely essential 
for SMEs. The SDF must devote much of its resources to building this 
fundamental planning capacity within firms. This has been regarded as one of the 
most successful aspects of SDF schemes elsewhere, and also a critical component 
of many incentive schemes that fund consultants to work with companies on 
planning for their strategic needs. We recommend that a proportion of funds be 
allocated specifically for this activity.  
 
In relation to priorities for training, we concur with the recommendations from Phase 
1 that there is a case for concentrating resources in ‘threshold’ areas of skill 
development where under-investment is likely to be greatest. Government resources 
for training should be targeted primarily at areas characterised by (1) high priority 
skill activities in (2) sectors with good development prospects, and they should be 




The SDF Board should work closely with the private sector to identify priority 
areas in which training funds should be concentrated. This process should take 
account of priority sectors already identified by the government and priorities for-
shadowed by the National Competitiveness Committee. Such priorities should be 
elaborated only after consultation with the private sector and in the light of in-
depth research.  
 
Training in priority areas could be further encouraged by offering premium rates to 
firms doing a disproportionate share of training within priority industries. This would 
help overcome the concern expressed by some firms that in high demand skills areas 
they experience high levels of outflow of trained staff. The industry as a whole can 
benefit through outflows of trained staff through increased spillovers of skills from 
individual firms. 
 
At present there is no systematic audit of training needs for technology development 
in priority industry clusters for Thailand. We propose that the SDF should work 
closely with the IDF and OSMEP in carrying out the proposed sector study outlined 
below in Section 4.5. 
 
Experience indicates that it is critical to integrate the range of support mechanisms for 
technology capability building within firms and not artificially splitting activities into 
‘R&D’, engineering/technology development, training etc. As such, many of the 
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proposals and options put forward above apply to support for technology development 
activities such as design and engineering, as well as to training and skill development. 
 
Integration of support for technology development and training is a key issue. It can 
be argued that, ‘precisely because of the current stage of capability development and 
technological learning in industry, there is a very blurred distinction between (1) 
support for technology development and (2) support for developing the underlying 
skills and capabilities needed to manage and implement it’. We therefore propose a 
set of recommendations for revising the system of incentives that support technology 




4.2 Recommendations for stimulating SMEs to improve technology capability 
by undertaking design and engineering activities 
 
Several issues have been raised in relation to incentives and support for other ‘non-
training’ incentives, particularly for SMEs. The first of these concerns the definition 
of R&D. At present it appears too narrow, both in terms of the eligible applicants and 
of the activities covered, to offer sufficient incentive for most Thai firms. The 
requirement to register a separate research organisation (or R&D unit) within the firm 
disadvantages SMEs in particular who may not have the organisational flexibility or 
constancy that a separate R&D unit requires.  
 
Recommendation 5: 
The definition of R&D payments should be extended to cover all in-house 
R&D performed by the firms themselves, not only within a firm’s registered 
R&D ‘organisation’ or approved institution as under present arrangements. 
 
Recommendation 6: 
For SMEs only, the definition of R&D under current financial incentives 
should be extended to cover technology development activities such as design 
and engineering activities that contribute more widely to enhanced 
productivity and competitiveness and not just activities directly linked to R&D 
as is the case at present. 
 
Many of the current schemes that support R&D are tax-based or loan-based. These are 
not particularly attractive to SMEs who face problems in raising collateral or with 
cash flow when compared with outright grants or ‘in kind’ support. On the other hand, 
there appears to be limited uptake of grants from SMEs (and the private sector 
generally) through the Thailand Research Fund. Under present arrangements, some 
firms who receive grants through the TRF are not eligible to receive the 200% tax 
concession for their private sector contribution because they are not carried out by an 
approved R&D provider. This is out of line with international practice and a 
disincentive for firms to apply for collaborative grants through the Fund. 
Recommendation 5 would ensure that firms who have been allocated a matching grant 
through for example TRF would be eligible to receive the 200% tax deduction for 
their private sector contribution – irrespective of where the research is carried out. 
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Further, R&D activities in firms in Thailand are more focused around development 
than around research. We believe that TRF should give serious consideration toward 
specifically targeting activities for matching grants with firms that emphasise 
technology development rather than just research as it is generally understood in 
universities and research institutions.  
 
Grants under the NSTDA Department of Industrial and Business Development appear 
well utilised and demand appears to be increasing. We suggest that this is because the 
latter relate more closely to smaller firms’ needs for expert services and the need for 




We recommend that the programs of matching grants offered through NSTDA 
schemes such as CD, ITAP, MTEC, BIOTEC and NECTEC, and through the 
DIP of the Ministry of Industry schemes such as ITB, Project 13 or MDIC. 
should be strengthened and be given greater flexibility in order to provide 
greater incentives for SMEs.  
 
This could be achieved, for example, by further promoting grants to groups of firms 
and placing a high priority on supporting grants for projects that include a 
combination of large and small firms. We note that among some of the NSTDA 
schemes there is an emphasis being placed on grants to groups of firms. This provides 
a stimulus to enhancing links between SMEs and larger firms with more advanced 
technological capabilities. The Singapore LIUP scheme discussed in this report 
provides an appropriate and successful model for this approach. 
 
A further criticism of the existing incentives (and related to the comments on uptake) 
is that they offer funding for defined R&D projects, but not for the support services 
required to carry them out (advice, consultancy, capability-building etc.). Access to 
expertise, consultancy and testing services is clearly a prerequisite for all but the most 
capable larger firms. Any expansion of existing schemes should be in this area rather 
than in support for R&D per se.  
 
In order to support basic levels of technology capability development and learning in 
Thai firms there should be a continued emphasis on strengthening the delivery and 
coordination of technology and skills development schemes, such as through MOI 
institutes that support expert consultancy and extension services, particularly to 
SMEs. One way of working toward this aim would be for the newly developed Office 
for SME Promotion to ensure a major component of their activities and support 
programs are directed toward technology enhancement. We would suggest that at 
least one third of their budget would be an appropriate proportion to target for this 
critical area of development. 
 
 
4.3 Building flexibility and options for incremental and progressive 
technology development into the system 
 
The recently established Innovation Development Fund offers the potential to support 
more substantial and sector focused technology development activities. We note that 
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to date it has only been possible to support a small number of projects. However, 
given more resources and a higher priority in government, for example through the 
National Competitiveness Committee (NCC), it would have the potential to provide a 
second level of support for innovation and technological development to complement 
the more basic capacity building provided through the innovation credits discussed 
above. Under present arrangements the IDF is providing support at the level of other 
programs available through NSTDA or DIP. Given sufficient support and autonomy it 
could perform a more valuable role in the incentive system by supporting much larger 
scale projects and involving larger numbers and clusters of firms along the supply 
chain. This would enhance skills flows from larger to smaller firms. Other innovative 
types of programs could include the provision of matching funds for industry 
technology and training institutes, and programs that focus on building linkages 
throughout the supply chain. 
 
 Recommendation 8: 
We recommend the Innovation Development Fund be given a high level of 
support from government and that it be established as an independent agency 
under its own Act. Its activities should be coordinated with the delivery of 
matching grants (or credits) through funds provided through NSTDA, DIP and 
the newly formed OSMEP. Coordination could be achieved by allocating 
responsibility to IDF or OSMEP for collating information on project delivery, 
monitoring and evaluation. This agency should report directly to the National 
Competitiveness Committee on monitoring and targeting technology 
incentives in priority sectors.  
 
 
One of the major findings of our review of the Thai schemes, when compared to 
international bench-marks, is the organisational complexity they present for the firms 
toward which they are targeted. It is important for the effectiveness of the overall 
system that the various schemes should not be dysfunctionally competing with each 
other but rather, offering complementarity. We therefore offer a range of suggestions 
for the rationalisation of some schemes and improving the ability of firms to move 
between schemes as their technology capacity deepens. 
 
Recommendation 9: 
We recommend building in greater flexibility to those schemes directed 
toward enhancing engineering and design capability through the introduction 
of ‘innovation credits for design and engineering’ available on a matching 
basis and available only to SMEs.  
 
Innovation credits would essentially provide grants along the lines of those already 
offered through existing programs. However, the introduction of credits would allow 
for greater flexibility enabling SMEs to direct their credits toward the range of 
technology development services required by the firms. They would also provide the 
opportunity for firms with similar needs to pool their credits. In other words they 
would be adjusted to demand rather than being driven by supply. 
 
Each eligible SME would be provided an annual allowance to ‘spend’ as it wishes on 
a defined range of technology development services. Service provision would be 
competitive and available through a range of providers including the private sector, 
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GRIs, universities and foreign consultants. The ‘credit’ could fund activities in 
approved external agencies or within the firm providing they are carried out with 
approved agencies or specialists. Firms could accumulate credits for no more than 2-3 
years and be allowed to participate in the scheme for up to 5 years, at which point 
they would be required to ‘graduate’ to other larger schemes. The ‘credit’ would be a 
small grant, paid to a third party. In the case of the UK Enterprise Initiative, it 
amounted to the equivalent of 15 consultant-days; in other cases it has been variable, 
for example related to the firm’s R&D personnel expenditure or other benchmarks. 
 
In order to enable the schemes to respond more effectively to the innovation credits 
there will be a need to achieve greater financial flexibility between schemes. As firms 
are able to progress toward greater technological capability they are likely to place 
greater emphasis on the acquisition of different skills for production processes. 
International experiences have shown that as greater flexibility is introduced into the 
system it is not always easy to predict changing patterns of demand. By introducing 
greater budget flexibility, schemes can more effectively respond to demand while at 
the same time being maintained within overall budget allocations. 
 
Recommendation 10: 
We recommend that the grants-based schemes available through NSTDA and 
DIP should be given greater budget flexibility to enable funds to be transferred 
between schemes according to demands within firms and the effective 
implementation of the ‘innovation credits for design and engineering’. 
 
 
We note that the BUILD program offered through BOI does not provide financial 
incentives for technology development but that through its VMC Program, BUILD 
does support the establishment of links between large and small firms. The objectives 
of the VMC program therefore are closely aligned with the objectives of the grants 
schemes discussed above, but with no resources to address the technology upgrading 
often required to qualify an SME as a supplier. The impact and implementation of the 
grants schemes could be strengthened if the VMC, NSTDA and DIP schemes are 
coordinated and integrated with the development and delivery of the proposed 
‘innovation credits for design and engineering’. 
 
Recommendation 11: 
We recommend that the activities undertaken through the BUILD VMC 
programme be closely coordinated with the grants-based schemes available 
through NSTDA and DIP, thereby marrying the linkage development efforts 
with the technological development support services. 
 
One option for achieving this would be to integrate responsibilities for these schemes 
to the Ministry of Industry19. This would serve to draw together the substantial links 
with large firms that have already been developed through BOI with the activities of 
NSTDA and DIP that have been working more closely with smaller firms. 
 
                                                 
19  Indeed, it is planned in October 2002 for the BOI to be integrated as a department within the 
Ministry of Industry. 
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4.4 Enhancing the delivery, impact and coordination of grant-based schemes 
 
An important issue for enhancing effective delivery of grants-based schemes is to 
minimise the potential for corruption and misuse of grant funds. Awarding bodies 
must be in a position to be able to scrutinise both the capability and honesty of 
applicant firms. Where schemes are discretionary, decisions on awarding grants or 
loans should be made by independent, expert committees. Their procedures and 
decisions should be open to scrutiny by public audit. This also applies equally to other 
financial incentives. Firstly, efforts must be made to choose recipients that are not 
overly prone to opportunism or theft. Financial institutions in advanced economies do 
this routinely, and agencies should also be able to find information on which to make 
judgements as to the reliability of potential target firms. A second step is to enforce 
agreements with firms to ensure that they abide by the terms on which incentives are 
offered. This involves the development of suitable legal and other institutions (as well 
as taking strenuous steps to make sure that agreements are adhered to. 
 
Recommendation 12: 
Financial sector organisations (such as the SME bank) should be contracted to 
act as administrative and possibly also decision-making intermediaries 
between the private sector claimants and the public sector funding agencies. 
 
 
We recommend that the enhanced delivery mechanisms and accountability achievable 
through the above recommendations should be matched with an increase in funds 
directed toward those schemes delivering credits as proposed above. These would 
essentially be directed toward grant-based schemes designed to stimulate technology 
development through enhancing design and engineering capabilities not otherwise 
covered through incentives directed toward increasing R&D.  
 
The present study has revealed that many countries in the regions have been making 
significant investments in technology capability building. It is difficult to make 
sensible comparisons regarding the levels of investment devoted to this area in 
different countries because there are so many variables that influence optimal models. 
However, it is clear that given the current level of technology development in the 
majority of Thai firms additional investment is required if Thailand is to provide an 
incentive system that will return any substantial benefit. We note that Australia, for 
example, devotes just under 19 percent of its total science and technology budget 
toward schemes for supporting innovation in firms.20 This does not take into account 
collaborative grants for R&D or cooperative research centres, which are also directed 
toward technology development in firms. For Thailand, the need to enhance 
technological capability in local firms is more pressing, yet indications are that budget 
allocations are not great and the richness of schemes falls short of more successful 
regional players. Without a considerable increase in the proportion of support directed 
toward technological development in firms in Thailand, other S&T investments will 
deliver increasingly smaller socio-economic returns.  
 
                                                 
20 Minister for Industry, Science and Resources (2000) Science and Technology Budget Statement 
2000-01, Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Canberra 2000. 
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Recommendation 13: 
We recommend that the budget directed toward increasing technology 
capabilities to firms other than for R&D should be increased to a level 
approaching 15 percent of the national S&T budget. This should provide 
sufficient stimulation for Thai firms to generate the capacity to more 
effectively absorb and build on the technology capabilities of more advanced 
firms and S&T institutions. 
 
A further set of issues relates to the coordination and delivery of incentive programs. 
There is a wide range of programs, with varying objectives, run by different Thai 
government agencies. Several of the schemes include support for R&D, training or 
technology acquisition/development as only part of their objective. It can be argued 
that these incentives are ‘too general’ – and that firms do not know what they cover 
and thus fail to take advantage of them.  
 
Further, some agencies may not be best qualified to deliver the incentives. BOI for 
example freely admits a lack of experience with R&D incentives. There also seems to 
be a perception by firms that if they apply for a tax concession (or even a loan), this 
application will somehow leave them open to additional scrutiny by the by revenue 
raising (taxation) agencies. In this case, the close linkage of the R&D tax concession 
with revenue collection agencies is a disincentive and they might be more effectively 
delivered by a ‘neutral’ agency. (In Australia, similar incentives are administered by 
the Industry Department on behalf of the Australian Taxation Office.) 
 
In addition, different technologies have different learning requirements. Programs 
tailored to the needs of one industry are therefore unlikely to be totally suitable for 
firms in other industries. Intermediary agencies with sectoral experience may assist in 
locating appropriate support for companies in the industry. In the case of Singapore’s 
LETAS scheme, delivery of the incentives is devolved to sectoral agencies that are 
familiar with the requirements of firms in their industry. 
 
In order to deliver a comprehensive ‘system’ of financial incentives there is a strong 
case for more deliberate coordination and integration of existing incentive schemes in 
a national strategy.  
 
Recommendation 14: 
A single government agency such as the Office of SME Promotion should be 
identified as the first point of contact for all schemes providing financial 
incentive for R&D, technology acquisition and development, and technical 
skills and training. The agency should have the task of publicising the schemes 
and disseminating information on eligibility, guidelines for funding etc. and 
for coordinating applications. Administration of the schemes would remain 
with existing Department (such as BOI and MOF schemes). 
 
Appropriate industry liaison bodies should be co-opted to deliver information 
on the schemes to their members/constituents.  
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4.5 The drive for national competitiveness  
 
Enhancing industrial technology capability is a critical prerequisite for developing 
competitiveness among Thai firms. The system of incentives discussed in this report 
and the proposals for enhancing the present system should be a central feature of the 
national competitiveness policy.  
 
 Recommendation 15: 
We recommend that a ‘policy forum for technology development incentives’ 
be established with representatives of all key agencies involved in the delivery 
of financial incentives for technology and skills development. The IDF and 
OSMEP would be appropriate agencies to initiate such a forum that should 
also have strong private sector representation. The forum should undertake to 
coordinate the scope and delivery of the incentives, and develop a strategy for 
comprehensive monitoring and evaluation of the schemes. It should also 
undertake to advise the National Competitiveness Committee and the Office 
for SME Promotion on the scope and impact of the financial incentives system 
and the level of financial resources required to support an effective incentives 
regime. 
 
Technology and skills development within Thai firms is a critical prerequisite for 
national competitiveness. Because of the urgent need to coordinate and generate 
greater efficiency and impact of public investments in raising technological capability 
in Thai firms we believe the National Competitiveness Committee should take on the 
task of establishing and chairing this forum. Because the NCC is not an implementing 
agency it would ensure neutrality is maintained in chairing the forum.  
 
Among the most immediate and pressing tasks for such a committee will be to 
develop an information base. This should have two elements: one directed toward 
program managers in firms; and another directed toward program managers of 
incentive schemes. The former could provide on-line access to managers in firms to 
assist them in identifying their technological problems and strategies for 
implementing improvements. The latter would enable scheme managers, also through 
an on-line service, to identify changing patterns and demands for services, successful 
versus less successful activities and practices, and areas where large and small firms 
are forming industry clusters. In addition it will assist them through sharing problems 
associated with targeting, program delivery and evaluation as well as developing 
strategies for dealing with them.  
 
In order to provide for comprehensive and coordinated monitoring and evaluation of 
schemes across the system the above committee should seek to develop an evaluation 
framework to guide periodic and ongoing scheme-based monitoring and evaluation. A 
useful model is the evaluation framework recently developed and refined by the 
Australian Department of Education, Science and Training.  
 
Throughout this report we have placed a strong emphasis on the need to target 
financial incentives toward critical technology thresholds in Thai firms. At a general 
level Phase 1 of this study identified an urgent need to enhance design and 
engineering capabilities in many large domestic firms and most Thai SMEs. Evidence 
collected through this project supports that observation. However, we believe that 
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further careful targeting can be directed toward the five industry priorities already 
identified by the NCC. In Chapter 3 we outlined a set of criteria for targeting financial 
incentives across sectors, firms and activities. An analysis of the critical technology 
thresholds in each of these five national priority areas would allow for more specific 
application of these criteria in areas where national priorities have already been 
defined. In order to maximise impact in these areas we propose that a study is 
undertaken to identify critical technology thresholds across each of sub-sectors 
comprising the five priority industry clusters. This will ensure incentives build on 
efforts and achievements already underway in the private sector. The study should 
also be carried out in collaboration with SDF in order to more effectively target and 
align incentives for skills and technology development. 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion: an action agenda 
 
The recommendations for revising the technology development incentive schemes 
presented in this report involve a range of agencies involved with their planning, 
delivery and evaluation. The complexity and fragmentation inherent in the present 
structure was illustrated in Exhibit 8. In order to achieve the changes proposed here 
we suggest an action plan that identifies key agencies responsible for some action on 
each recommendation. We group these under the following agencies: NSTDA; BOI; 
the Office for SME Promotion; the Skills Development Board; the Innovation 





Recommendation 9:  
 
Action: In collaboration with the Office for SME Promotion, design a program for the 
implementation and finance of ‘innovation credits for design and engineering’ 
available to SMEs along the lines described above and to seek the support of the 
National Competitiveness Committee and the Office for SME Promotion. The 
innovation credits scheme could be initially implemented within current budget 
constraints by targeting only key national priority industry sectors. The scheme could 
be progressively extended into other areas.  
 
Recommendation 10:  
 
Action: Explore options with the Budget Bureau for budget flexibility to transfer funds 
between schemes according to private sector demand. 
 
 
BOI - MOI 
 
Recommendation 11:  
 
Action: In collaboration with NSTDA, coordinate the promotion, delivery and 
evaluation of grants-based schemes available through NSTDA and DIP and in 
particular to link large firms promoted through the BUILD program to the support 
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and delivery of training for technology development in smaller firms and groups of 
smaller firms. 
 
Recommendation 13:  
 
Action: In collaboration with NSTDA, propose a target budget in the S&T Action 
Plan for increasing technology capabilities to support innovation credits at a level 
approaching 15 percent of the national S&T budget.  
 
 
Office for SME Promotion,  
 
Recommendation 7:  
 
Action: Promote the programs of matching grants offered through NSTDA and DIP to 
enhance accessibility for SMEs. 
 
Recommendation 12:  
 
Action: Investigate the potential role of the SME bank, or other financial agency to be 
contracted to act as administrative intermediaries between the private sector 
claimants for grant-based incentives and public sector funding. 
 
Recommendation 14:  
 
Action: Establish a first and single point of contact for all schemes providing 
financial incentive for enhancing technology and skills development for SMEs.  
 
 
The Skills Development Board  
 
Recommendations 1 - 4:  
 
Action: Introduce mechanisms for involving the private sector in the design and 
delivery of training, to introduce flexibility appropriate for SMEs, carrying out 
research and planning, and responding to private sector training needs.  
 
 
The Innovation Development Fund 
 
Recommendation 8:  
 
Action: To carry forward with NSTDA and BOI a plan for coordinating the delivery 
of matching grants (or credits) and identifying responsibilities for collecting 




Recommendation 15:  
 
Action: In collaboration with OSMEP and NSTDA, establish a ‘policy forum for 
technology development incentives comprising key agencies involved in the delivery 
of financial incentives for technology and skills development. The Forum should carry 
out an initial set of tasks concerning coordination of information, promotion and 
evaluation.  
 
IDF, OSMEP and NSTD should take the first initiative to develop a proposal for the 
NCC to support a study to investigate technology capabilities in key industry sub-
sectors comprising the five national industry priority clusters. This should be 
developed and carried out in collaboration with the SDF. 
 
 




Action: Extend matching grants to Thai firms to support technology development 
activities as well as research matching grants (see page 47). 
  
 
Ministry of Finance - Department of Revenue  
 
Recommendation 5:  
 
Action: Remove the registration requirement on firms for eligibility for the 200% 
R&D tax concession. 
 
Recommendation 6:  
 
Action: Extend the allowance for the 200% a tax concession to design and 
engineering activities that contribute to enhanced productivity and competitiveness 
for SMEs, but not necessarily directly emerging from R&D.  
 
 
We believe that this action and the implementation of these recommendations will 
significantly improve the system of financial incentives for enhancing Thailand’s 
industrial technological capabilities. However, we concur with the observation made 
in Phase 1 that ‘financial incentive mechanisms, however they are designed, will not 
on their own induce radical change in attitude and behaviour’. The incentive regime 
must be embedded in, and articulated with, Thailand’s broader strategies and 
institutions for scientific and technological development and national 
competitiveness. In particular, they should be consistent with and build on the efforts 
already underway within firms in Thailand. We believe the recommendations offered 
from this study will contribute toward that aim. 
 
Finally, the recommendations and action identified above are focused on bringing 
about some immediate change by stimulating demand for technology development in 
the private sector. This approach, following international experiences, also contributes 
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to the longer term objective of transferring the benefits from technology enhancement 
in the private sector to Thai society more generally. We therefore draw attention to 
the need to complement the recommendations made in this report with longer term 







Table A1: Administrative benefits and constraints on different forms of financial 
incentive for research and technology development 
Assistance 
measure 





to all firms that meet 
stated criteria. 
Businesses more likely to 




chosen by industry.  
Maintenance of firm 
confidentiality. 
Speedy processing (where 
approval ‘automatic’). 




activity that would have 
occurred anyway (unless 
based on incremental 
performance, which is 
hard to police). 
Abuse eg ‘double 
dipping’ – if firms also 
eligible to claim loans or 
grants.  
Selection criteria may 
encourage risk aversion to 
achieve short-term 
repayment.  
Cost is open-ended (difficult to 
control the level of revenue 
foregone). 
Relatively simple administration. 
Does not require annual approval of 
budget. 
Usually requires changes to taxation 
legislation. 
Requires careful accounting of 
eligible costs within the firm. 




Can be targeted widely or 
for focused activities.  
Priorities or scope (type, 
timing, size) set by govt., 
specific proposals made 
by firms.  
Less likely to subsidise 
activity that would have 
occurred in any case. 
Formal application may 
be required.  
Cumbersome and lengthy 
selection procedure.  
Maximum cost can be set, but actual 
cost hard to determine. 
Requires annual budget. 
Requires formal procedure for 
application and selection. 
Difficult to decide what constitutes a 
successful outcome for the purpose 
of repayment – clear criteria 
required. 
Grants Generally for focused 
activities. Priorities or 
scope set by govt., 
specific proposals made 
by firms. 
Less likely to subsidise 
activity that would have 
occurred in any case. 
Formal application 
required. Cumbersome 
and lengthy selection 
procedure. 
Annual cost is set.  
Requires clear criteria for selection 
and evaluation of outcomes.  
Requires formal procedure for 




Table A2: A framework for assessing the coverage of grant-based government assistance for technology capability development within 
firms  
Objective Types of assistance required Example of foreign schemes that provide 
such assistance21 
A. Assistance targeted at 
individual firms 
  
1. Strategic capabilities 
(awareness of the 
technological and business 
environment) 
a) Business capability development 
b) Business and technology audits 
c) Mentoring by other firms or organisations; industry ‘masterclasses’ 
d) Awareness, visits to ‘demonstration’ sites, technology benchmarking 
etc 
e) Feasibility assessments 
The Enterprise Initiative (UK) (a, b, e) 
National Technology Audit Program -NTAP 
(Irl.) (b) 
Benchmarking Index (UK) (a, b) 
SMART Scheme (UK) (e) 
LETAS (Sing.) (a, b, e) 




a) Subsidies for R&D 
b) Subsidies for development of technology or for particular types of 
technology (e.g. ITC, biotechnology) 
c) Selection of plant and equipment 
d) Manufacturing consultancies 
e) Subsidy for adoption (purchase) of technologies (e.g. CNC, IT)  
f) Feasibility assessment - new product or process development 
NTAP (Irl.) (c) 
SMART Scheme (UK) (b, c, e) 
Feasibility Grants (Irl.) (f) 
Steinbeis Foundation for Economic Promotion 
(Germ.) (d) 
LETAS (Sing.) (d, f) 
R&D Start (Aust.) (a, b) 
SDF (Sing.) (b) 
3. Management of intangible 
technological resources 
(knowledge, skills and 
training) 
a) Quality programs 
b) Placement of skilled personnel within firm (e.g. secondment of 
postgraduates, technicians or technical managers, graduate 
recruitment, salary subsidy) 
c) Loan/secondment of R&D personnel 
d) Training needs/strategy analysis 
e) Training course subsidies 
f) Secondment of firm’s personnel to other firms/organisations 
Techstart and Techman (Irl.) (b, c) 
KIM (Netherl.) (b) 
Engineers to Japan (UK) (f) 
LETAS (Sing.) (a, d) 
R&D Start (Aust.) (b) 
SDF (Sing.) (d, e) 
HRDF (Malay.) (d, e) 
                                                 
21 The basic structure and examples are taken from Arnold et al (2000), modified and extended by the current study. The European examples herein are also from the Phase 1 
report, pp. 147-170, where details of each scheme mentioned may be found. 
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Table A2 (cont.) 
 
4. Organisational structures 
and assets 
a) Technology management courses 
b) Technology management consultants 
R&D Management Scheme (Irl.) (a) 
LETAS (Sing.) (b) 
5. Linkage and networking 
capabilities (ability to 
access external 
knowledge, to manage 
user-producer relations, to 
form alliances with 
partners) 
a) Subsidies for use of external consultants or expert services 
b) Subsidies for use of university or GRI staff 
c) Subsidised access to GRIs and quality/testing/standards facilities 
d) ‘Innovation credits’ allowing firms to purchase services from a 
range of providers 
Innovation Vouchers scheme (UK) (d) 
LETAS (Sing.) (a) 
HRDF (Malay.) (a) 
B. Assistance targeted at 
groups of firms and 
technology organisations 
  
Linkage and networking 
capabilities 
a) Subsidised and/or facilitated R&D or technology development 
collaborations or networks 
b) Support for university-industry GRI collaboration 
c) Technology transfer or brokerage (GRI-industry; university to 
industry, firm to firm) 
d) Industry associations, and their firm networks 
e) Technology centres, tech. Parks 
f) Liaison offices and information services 
g) Support for firm’s ‘supplier development’ programs 
h) Public procurement 
i) ‘Partner search’ programs 
j) Firm to firm network programs (e.g. MNC-SME, SME networks) 
k) Support for technology demonstration projects and 
publications/information diffusion 
l) Personnel exchanges between firms 
BTS and predecessor schemes (Netherl.) (a, b, 
g, j)) 
Steinbeis Foundation for Economic Promotion 
(Germ.) (c. j) 
Technologie Transfer Ring Handwerk (Germ.) 
(c, d) 
Programs in Advanced Technology PATS 
(Irl.) (b, c).  
FMW (Germ.) (b, c, l) 
RUK (Indon.) (b) 
LETAS (Sing.) (f) 
SDF (Sing.) (d, j) 






Diagnostics for Reviewing the System of Schemes 
 
1. International Benchmarking 
 
• Scope of scheme by comparison with international best practice. 
• Scale (budget, coverage) of scheme by comparison with international best practice. 
• Impact of scheme on the client population by comparison with international examples.  
 
2. Clarity of Structure and Goals 
 
• Presence of clearly defined objectives for the scheme.  
• A clearly defined client base (target population) for the scheme. 
• Degree of awareness of scheme and its components on the part of putative clients (target 
population). 
• Absence of countervailing schemes (e.g. other incentives that make this incentive less 
attractive or unattractive to clients). 
• Absence of overlap with other incentive schemes. 
• Unambiguous definition of activities covered, eligibility criteria, guidelines for applicants 
etc. 
 
3. Effective Management  
 
• Good procedures and management practices in place 
• Transparency of administration  
• Funds allocated by an expert panel.  
• Scheme is managed by a dedicated, expert secretariat familiar with technological 
innovation. 
• Presence of explicit performance measures or indicators for the scheme.  
 
4. Client and Scheme Performance 
 
• Number of clients (by comparison with the target population). Is demand for the scheme 
growing? 
• Quality of applications; success rate of applications (grants as proportion of applications) 
• Evidence of user satisfaction (grant/loan recipients) with scheme. 
• ‘Success stories’ of projects/companies supported by the scheme. 
• Expenditure of funds as proportion of allocated budget. 
• Existence of any evaluation (internal or external) of the effectiveness of the scheme. 
• Effective use of resources: Scheme operating costs as a proportion of total scheme 
budget; Program operating costs per client. 
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Exhibit 11: Examples of Skills development incentives in Singapore 
Environment: 
• Singapore has a sound education system, with a bias to early vocational training. 
• A range of public and private training providers operates in competitive 
environment. 
• A range of human resource development programs apart from the SDF is in place. 
• Skills Development Fund: Financing and Administration 
• Its SDF is long-standing: established 1979 under the National Productivity Board, 
Trade and Industry Ministry. 
• The SDF has evolved: originally established with employer subsidies; moved to 
planned training priorities, 1987; adopted an SME focus, 1992. 
• It is funded by a 1% employer levy on low-paid, unskilled workers; At times the 
levy has been set higher: at 2% (initially) and 4%. 
• Its budget in 1996-7 was S$86 mill.  
• Most of its budget comes from industry funding and interest on invested funds; 
only 2% is from government funds (1991 figures). However, expenditure is 
currently exceeding the amount raised from levies; and government ‘tops up’ the 
Fund. 
• Assistance is provided on a cost sharing principle: SDF pays 50-80% of cost, 
employers pay 20-50%. 
• It has provided grants for more than 500,000 training places. 
• In 1990, 30,000 approvals were made; a 90% success rate. 
• It requires prior approval for programs and involves a 2-year wait for 
reimbursement in some cases. 
• Monitoring and evaluation are carried out at three levels: 
• Macro-level (skills shortages, redundancies) 
• Program level (various performance indicators) 
• Firms/trainees (client quality control/tracer studies) 
• The SDF manages a broad portfolio of schemes/programs. 
SDF Schemes & Programs 
• Training Grants 
• Training Leave (for unskilled mature workers)  
• Training Vouchers (all firms are eligible) 
• Worker Training Plan (to support a firm-level approach to training) 
• Training Needs Analysis Consultancy Scheme (assistance with training strategy 
for locally-owned firms) 
• Approved-in-principle Scheme (pre-accreditation of public courses, making it 
easier for firms to use them) 
• Emerging/Critical Skills Development Grants (eg in nominated priority areas like 
robotics, wafer fabrication, health care) 
• Basic Education for Skills Training - BEST (providing fundamental functional 
literacy/numeracy, to ‘Year 6’ level). 
• Worker Improvement Through Secondary Education - WISE (English, Maths) 
• Training Infrastructure Development 
• Partnerships with MNCs to set up industry-specific training centres. 
• Financial assistance to trades union groups for training. 
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Exhibit 12: Examples of Skills development incentives in Malaysia 
Environment: 
• There is strong industry involvement in training, especially with MNCs as partners. 
• In several cases, an effective regional focus has been successfully created (eg the Penang 
Skills Development Centre, where ‘competing companies pool their resources’). 
Malaysian HRD Fund and Council: Funding and Administration 
• HRD Fund and Council were in established 1992; under the Ministry of Human 
Resources and have been in operation since 1993. 
• Council comprises 14 members: 8 from industry, 4 from government, and 2 independent 
(i.e. a non-government majority). 
• The Fund covers all manufacturing and selected service industries. 
• There is a mandatory 1% levy on the payroll of firms with 10 or more staff which have 
high capital assets (50 or more staff in manufacturing). 
• In addition, there is an optional 0.5% levy on manufacturing firms with 10-50 staff which 
have low capital assets. 
• The budget is MYR 50 mill. of levy/interest funds, plus MYR 16 mill. government funds 
• The levy is collected through the commercial banking system.  
• Grants defray partial costs. Firms can reclaim the levy they paid in each year, up to 75% 
or 80% of the costs of training. 
• Eligibility for grants/loans 
• Firms must be registered (i.e. they must be levy-payers and up-to-date with their 
payments; levy defaulters are barred from receiving support). 
• The trainees must be Malaysian citizens. 
• The training mode must be approved by the HRDC, although there is some ‘pre-approval’ 
of training providers, training courses and, importantly, firms’ own annual training plans.  
• Eligible skill areas are defined, but quite broad. The overriding criterion is that training 
must be of direct benefit to the business. 
Malaysian HRDF: Schemes and programs 
• SBL: Grants for all types of firm-based training for registered firms. 
• SBL Pre-Approved: As above, for regular in-house programs. For example, induction 
courses for new recruits do not require individual approval if the content is the same.  
• PROLUS: Reimbursement for recognised external training courses. There is a register of 
approved providers / training programs from both the public and private sectors. 
• PERLA: Companies pay 20-25% of course fee to the approved provider, the HRDC pays 
balance to provider. This is particularly useful for SMEs who do not have to provide the 
money ‘up front’. 
• JURUPLAN: Provides assistance from consultants in developing the firm’s annual 
training plans (HRDF meets 50-70% of the cost of the consultant). 
• PLT: Provides blanket approval of firms’ annual training plans 
• SLB: Supports joint in-house training schemes, i.e. cooperation in training provision 
between firms, especially between SMEs and MNCs. 
• Apprenticeship scheme: eg mechatronics/electronics; hotel industry (100% cost) 





Attachment 4: (A) Table on Financial Incentives for R&D Technology Development and Innovation in Thai 
Firms 
Note: The information in this table is presently being compiled and checked as part of a project being carried out by Wollongong University and the Brooker Group for the National 
Science and Technology Development Agency with financial support from the World Bank. It represents a work in progress and will be a key input into the final outputs from the 
project designed to enhance the financial incentive system to support industrial competitiveness in Thailand. 
1. Office of the Prime Minister 








Promotion for R&D 




– Activities 7.13 
Promotion for 
Calibration Services – 
Activities 7.14 
1.1 Office of 





or Vocational Training 
Centers – Activities 
7.15.1 
• Tax-based incentives: tax 
holidays (scale of incentives 
are subject to location of 
activities whether located in 
special investment promotion 
zones, nature of production – 
export, or engaging in 
industries identified as 
Priority Activities 
• Non-tax privileges: 
guarantees, protections, 
permissions, and services 
(regardless of location) 
• Income tax concession on the 
payment for Goodwill, 
Copyright, Patent, 
Trademark, Royalty, Know-
how, etc.  
• Tax-based incentives: 8 year 
income tax holidays or tariff 
exemptions, without zoning 
issue (only for activities) 
• Income tax exemption 
dividend derived from the 
promoted activities 
• To promote 
firm based 
R&D 































sheet to BOI 
by firms 










• Private investors 
not enthusiastic 
• Incentives provided 
for R&D activities 
are quite similar to 
general BOI 
incentives granted 
to other activities 
• Focused primarily 
on services for 
firms rather than in 
firms – 
• Difficult to predict 
budget implications 
in advance  
• Incentives offered 




• Lack of qualified 
researchers 
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R&D Machinery and 
Equipment 
Depreciation 
40% depreciation rate of the 
cost of machinery/ 
equipment on the acquired 
date in the first year, and 
lower as indicated in general 
accounting practice in the 
following years 
• To promote 
R&D activities 
by reducing tax 
burden 








• Section 65 bis (2) 
of the Revenue 
Code,  
• Section 4 bis of 
Royal Decree 




Income Tax No. 
48 











• Focused mainly 
on firms already 
capable of 
carrying out 
their own R&D 
2.1  The 
Revenue 
Department 
Tax Concession for 
R&D Expenditure 
• Applicable to certified 












• 200% of R&D 
expenditure for tax 
computation  
• Project certified by 
NSTDA 
• Encourage firm 
contracting out 
R&D projects 
• Promote local 














• Section 3(1) of 
the Revenue 
Code, 
• Royal Decree 
No. 297, B.E. 
2539 
• Ministry of 
Finance 
Notification on 
Income Tax No. 
















n   
    (9 projects) 
• Following up 
with firms by 
NSTDA on 
progress of 
the project  
 




• Only few firms 
participating 












Institution Scheme Mechanism Objective Current Private Sector Monitoring Critical Issues 
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Legislation “Take Up” 
Budget 
System 
Tax exemption for 
training providers 
• Certified training 
providers are allowed to 
have tax exemption for 
generated profits 
• To promote 
training 
providers 




284, B.E. 2538 
N/A N/A  2.1  The 
Revenue 
Department 
Tax Concession for 
Training Expenditure 
• 150% tax concession for 
expenditure on 
employee training  
 Training with the 
Department of Skill 
Development 
 In-house training 
approved by the 
Department of Skill 
Development 








298, B.E. 2539 
(1996-2000) 
Average 175 
Million Baht a 
year or 1.16 
million Baht 
per firm 
N/A • Lack of skill 
development 
policy to meet 
industry’s needs 








of R&D Machinery 
Import Duties 
• Scientific tools: 30-40% 
to 5% or less 
• R&D chemical substance: 
30% to 5-20% 
• Environmentally sound 
and economically 
machinery:  
      30-40% to 5% 
• Computer and computer 
parts: 20-40% to 5-1% 
• Electronics Parts: 35% to 
1% 
• Scientific education 
equipment: tax exempted 
• R&D testing equipment: 
15-35% to 5% 
• To encourage 
technology 
acquisition 
• To reduce cost 
conducting R&D 





takes long time 
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 Replacement of 
used machinery 
• Modification of 
machinery 
• Soft loan with 5-7 year 
repayment term 








 (2000)  
4.79 billion 
Baht 








Credit Guarantee • Guarantee unsecured 
credit but not exceeding 
50% of the total credits 
with the lender 
• Maximum guarantee 
amount not exceeding 
Baht 40 million for each 
enterprise 
• Annual fee at 1.75% of 
guaranteed amount, 
payable in advance 
• To assist SME 
lacking fixed 
assets to 
guarantee loan to 
be able to obtain 
more loan from 
commercial 
banks 
• Section 11, 
12(1) and (9) 
of the SICGC 
Act, B.E. 2534 
Total 
outstanding 
loan in 2000: 
755 million 
Baht 
 • Fees considered 
high 





















• Soft loan for R&D 
 Baht 10 million 
loan per project 
 2.5% interest rate 
 less than 8 years 
maturity 
• Soft loan for building up 
laboratory 
 Baht 10 million 
loan per project 
 MLR-4% interest 
rate 
 less than 8 years 
maturity 




 Baht 10-20 million 
 MLR-3% interest 
rate 





which must be 
able to 
commercialize 




















• Fixed interest rate 
is not attractive 
particularly after 









• Small firms cannot 
find sufficient 
collateral 
• Too small amount 
for large firms 
• Gradual decline in 
the number of 
project approved (9 
at the beginning 
decreasing to 1 at 
present) 
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Institution Scheme Mechanism Objective Current 
Legislation 
Private Sector 











Development Fund  
• Grants 
 For projects in stage of 
prototype, pilot plant, 
pre commercial, full 
scale trial or 
commercial start up 
 Not more than 50% of 
total budget proposed 
by the team and lesser 
than Baht 10 million 
 Recover grant after the 
project has been 
commercialized (full 
amount repayment or 
monthly royalty fees 
• Soft loan and 
investment funds 
 Focusing on projects 
requiring financial 
support of more than 
Baht 10 M 
• Technical Support 
 Provide assistance in 
project development 
 Conclude the project 
and disseminate 
information 
 Technical training  
 Hire experts for 
technology transfer 
 Reengineer business 
process & management 





• To support 
private sector 
design and create 
prototype 
• To provide 
expertise to 
private sector 
• To promote 









• Section 12 of 
the NSTDA 

























• Very little uptake 
• Unavailability of 
matching fund as 






criteria is very 
strict 
• Lack of 
understanding of  
R&D capability 
[?]in firms 
















Standards, Testing and 









• Advisory services 
on ISO9000 
• Consultancy services 
and technical assistance 
•  
















50% support of expenditure 
occurred from TFQS quality 
system standard set up but 
lesser than Baht 30,000 




firms not able to 
acquire ISO9000 










firms to devote to 
the project 
• Firms have to 
place a deposit to 
guarantee their 
commitment, 
unless it will be 
forfeited 
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• 100% of expenditure 
grant for research 
projects in universities, 
lesser than Baht 5 
million 
• 75% of expenditure 
grant for basic research 
by private sector 
• 50% of expenditure 
grant for research that is 
almost ready for 
marketing 
• To promote 
private and 
public sector 
doing R&D and 
innovation 
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• Financial Support 




• Soft loans 
 Maturity lesser than 7 years 
 Supported by financial 
institutions participating in 
the project 
 Government supports 2/3 
of the total loan while the 
rest is supported by 
participated financial 
institution (not more than 
75% of the project value 
and lesser than 30 million 
Baht) 
 Private sector has to invest 
not lesser than 50% of the 
total investment 
 Interest rate = (Reference 
Rate + 2.25%) / 2 
• Grants 
 Grant not more than 50% 
of total investment and 
lesser than Baht 3 million 
per project 
 67% grant of total 
investment, but lesser than 
Baht 3 million per project 
is available in some cases 
 Repay the loan when 
research results could be 
commercialized 
 No longer available  
• To promote and 
support R&D 
and engineering 
in private sector 





grants and soft 
loans to reduce 
R&D risks  
 







1) soft loan 






























every 6 months 
by ITA and 
experts 
• Firms still have 
to invest half of 
R&D cost 
• Difficulty in 
guaranteeing 
principal 
• Issues of 
intellectual 
property right: 





• Main emphasis 
on firms already 
with R&D 
capability. 
• Similar schemes 
are also provided 
by other agencies 
eg. TRF, IDF 
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(ITAP) – (formerly 
known as ICS) 
• Grant not exceeding 
50% of the total 
expenses and within 
Baht 500,000 

























firms. At the end 
of the project, a 
report submitted 
by firms  
• Firms have to 
advance the 
expenditure and 
taking time to be 
reimbursed  
• Language barrier 
between foreign 
consultants and Thai 
firms 
• Implementation of 
recommendations is 
still a problem 
• Firms’ attitudes 
towards their 
competitiveness 
when the same 
consultant provide 




















• Grants  supported for 
airfare 
















whether traveling is 
work or pleasure 
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Free of charge except IP 
application filing services 



























• Joint-venture with private 
enterprises in science and 
technology investment that is 
vital to the country 
• Investment by NSTDA should 
not be more than 49% 






NSTDA Act, B.E. 
2534 








• Scientific analysis 
• Product testing 
• Product standardization 
   
Research and 
Development Services 
• Research and development 
• Manufacturing process design 
and development 
• Consultation 






Technology transfer • Transfer of technology to rural 
areas 
• Disseminate information to 
researchers and stakeholders 
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4. Ministry of Industry 
Public and in-house 
Training Courses 
• Provides training to 
public 
• Training cost subsidized 
by government 
















    
Testing       
Supplier Development 
Program 
• Applicable to SMEs 
• Group consulting: 
supporting funds of Baht 
200,000 for expert fee per 
factory 
• Individual consulting: 
supporting funds of 75% 
but lesser than Baht 
200,000 for expert fee per 
factory 









 Japanese Technology 
Transfer Program: 
supported by JETRO, 
JICA, JODC, NEDO 
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Institution Scheme Mechanism Objective Current 
Legislation 
Private Sector 
















• CNC/ CAD/ CAM 
Technology 




• Plant Maintenance 
• Funding supported by 
the German gvt,  MOI 
and Thai and German 
private sector  
• Short modules 
• Teaching factory 
• Small group teaching 
• Hi-tech equipment 
training 
• In-plant training 





















• HRD advice  
• Training needs 
assessment  
• Design of machine 
process prototypes 




running costs  




Funding supported by the 
German government and 
MOI 
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• Grants supporting expert 
fees 
 90% for firms with less 
than 100 employees 
 80% for firms with more 
than 100 employees 
   Similar schemes 
are offered within 
the same 
department 
 Consultancy Service • Grants supporting expert 
fees – 20% of the total 


















are offered within 
the same 
department 
 Project 13 • Grants supporting expert 
fees – 50% but lesser than 
200,000 Baht 
  • Report by 
consultants 
Strictly abide by 
fiscal year 
Group consultant 





 MDIC • Grants supporting expert 
fees – 2/3 of the cost but 
not more than 900,000 
Baht 
    
 Training Fund • Grants support 50% of 
training cost directly to 
consultant but lesser than 
150,000 Baht 









2002 was Baht 
10 million 
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Soft loan for trainees, 1% 
interest rate, for training 
expenses and personnel 
expenditure occurred during 
the training 




N/A    
 Training 
• Basic Training 
• Skill Upgrading 
Training 
• Skill Certification 
• Provides skill 
development training  
• Cost of training 
subsidized by the 
government 
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 Mass & 
Balance 
 Temperature 
 Guage Block 
 Humidity 
 Length 
• Technology supported 
by TPA members 
• Subsidized by funds 
supporting TPA from 
MITI 






 • Training Services 









• Technology supported 
by TPA members 
• Subsidized by funds 
supporting TPA from 
MITI 
•  •     
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Industrial Research  
Support Scheme: 
Medical Equipment 





















• Non specific amount of 
supporting grants but 
also require investment 
from the private sector 
(at least 20% of the total 
project value) 




• Grants not exceeding 
Baht 50,000 for issue 
identification and 
additional Baht 50,000 
for project proposal 
preparation 








• Emphasis on 
SME at the 
beginning stage 















• Site visit or 
presentation 
on progress of 













budget is lesser 
than firms’ 
demand 





while firms do 
• Private sector 
investment in 
the scheme is 
not qualified to 
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